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
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
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A
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OF
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHICAL
TERMS

BY
FRANCIS GARDEN, M.A.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

SUB-DEAN OF HER MAJESTY'S CHAPELS ROYAL, CHAPLAIN TO THE HOUSEHOLD
IN ST. JAMES' PALACE, AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AND
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TO THE REV. THE PRINCIPAL,

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AND

THE STUDENTS,

OF

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THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE INSCRIBED,

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OF THAT NOBLE INSTITUTION,

BY

THE AUTHOR.



PREFACE

THE following work may be accused if of no other fault, yet of being superfluous, after *the Vocabulary of Philosophy* by the late Dr. Fleming, of Glasgow, of which a third edition has lately appeared, under Dr. Calderwood's supervision. But it may be seen at once that my aim is different, even as my labours have run in a line different, from those of Dr. Fleming. He undertook to furnish *a Vocabulary of Philosophy*, I have endeavoured to produce *a Dictionary of English Philosophical Terms*. Consequently he goes into a variety of metaphysical questions on which I have felt no call to enter, and cites authors who may not be within the reach of the readers whom I have in view. On these, I suspect that Dr. Fleming's labours, no matter what their value, might have none but a confusing effect. Anyhow, the difference between his scope and purpose and mine will be seen at a glance by going over our tables of contents. These will show that we not only write with a different end, but give very different degrees of attention to the words which we discuss, and so far deal with different subjects.

I have called my book *a Dictionary of English Philosophical Terms*, but have admitted two or three

technical ones composed of Latin words, such as *à priori* and the like. Though Latin, they enter without translation into English prose, and the learner has a right to be furnished with a clear view of their meaning.

It is, I think, very important that the English student should know the origin of words which he encounters sometimes in our old and greatest writers, sometimes in his ordinary reading, sometimes in common conversation. Such continually were born in the schools, and escaping from the cradle of their earliest life, have passed into general use with departures from their first meaning, but of which the new sense thus given is comparatively seldom quite unconnected with that. "The manner," says my friend the Archbishop of Dublin, "is very curious in which the metaphysical or theological speculations, to which the busy world was indifferent, or from which it was entirely averse, do yet in their results descend to it, and are adopted by it; while it remains quite unconscious of the source from which they spring, and counts that it has created them for itself and out of its own resources."¹ However he may content himself with

¹ TRENCH, *Select Glossary*, art. "Common Sense." In this, however, I have pointed out that the distinguished author is mistaken in classing Reid with those who denote by Common Sense only "plain wisdom, the common heritage of man." Reid uses the term for something quite different, and in a sense known to philosophers, though not that, also philosophical, of which Archbishop Trench speaks.

applying a term to which the schools gave birth in some ordinary sense to which it may have descended, a man will use it better, with more exact force, and a greater security against ambiguity, who has acquired the knowledge and retains the impression of its origin. In reading too our grand old English prose, that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we shall generally find scholastic words used in their purely scholastic sense, which sense we must be aware of if we would understand what we read.

Moreover, the student may propose to himself further logical and metaphysical study. It seems desirable, therefore, that he should know something of the language in which it is to be pursued, even before he plunges into the questions which Dr. Fleming presents to his view. For this reason I think myself justified in handling some terms more completely technical than those of which I have hitherto been speaking.



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
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ENGLISH PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS.

Absolute. That which, complete in itself, needs no relation to anything else. Thus we speak of the *Genitive Absolute* in Greek, and the *Ablative Absolute* in Latin, when a participle and noun in such cases express their full meaning without being grammatically connected with any other member of the sentence. An *absolute ruler* is a sovereign checked by no order of men or constitutional element in the country which he governs. An *absolute decree* is that which is held by many to have eternally fixed the characters and destinies of men, irrespectively of anything foreseen in them.

It is plain that the only absolute being is God. All others exist, act, and manifest themselves in relation to conditions outside themselves. The Divine existence and perfections are independent of all external relations. This does not mean that God cannot place Himself in such relations; but that it is of His own will when He does so. He does act in relations to the moral beings whom He has created, but both they and the relations are the fruits of His good pleasure, and His own Being and attributes are independent of them.

Abstract, Abstraction. None of the objects presented to us by perception are simple. Even the least complicated are combined of various quali-

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ties; and in order to attain a distinct notion of any of these, it is needful to separate it in thought from the rest of the combination in which it presents itself. The process whereby this is done is called abstraction, *a drawing off*; and that which is thus drawn off from the elements with which it is surrounded is said to be viewed *abstractedly*, or *in the abstract*.

Similarly, nothing is ever seen by us in the mere aspect of its *definition*, but always with attendant accidents which do not enter into that definition, and occur some in one object that comes under it, some in another. When therefore we withdraw our attention from these, and fix it simply on the definition, we perform an act of abstraction.

The opposite to the *abstract* is the *concrete* (from the participle passive of *concrescere*, to grow together with). It is in the *concrete* that all objects are *perceived* by us. Their definition or some of their qualities when taken by themselves are not perceived but *thought*.

The process of abstraction is a necessary antecedent to that of *generalization*. The concrete presentation cannot be an universal, and only by abstracting that which such presentation has in common with others can we arrive at one.

It has been questioned whether language be not a necessary condition of abstraction, and therefore whether the infant before acquiring that, and the lower animals who never do, are capable of the

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process. Undoubtedly, language by supplying us with names for abstractions is a great aid in the formation of such, nor could we exercise the faculty to any great extent without it. But on the other hand the faculty seems a needful preliminary to the formation of abstract words. It is likely that in this matter, as in the case of so many elements of our mental being, the two act and re-act on each other. Without the faculty of abstraction we could make no abstract terms ; and without abstract terms, the faculty of abstraction would be little developed.

Whether it be true that the lower animals are incapable of abstraction is a question not easily decided. In the gradual inspection and then complete recognition of an old friend from whom he has long been separated, the dog seems to arrive at a synthesis of marks and attributes, each of which he must have considered in the abstract. What I should be inclined to say is that he abstracts but little, and scarcely generalizes, if he does the latter at all.

The principal sciences which deal with abstractions are mathematics and logic. These in their pure form are wholly abstract. So too is their symbolic notation. But all science as such demands abstraction, without which there could be no generalization. The naturalist no doubt examines a specimen of concrete existence, but his aim is to arrive at the definition under which it comes, and the class to which it belongs, and this

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can only be done by separating essential characteristics from the accidents with which they are accompanied.

Absurd or Impossible, reduction to the. This is a mode of establishing a position by showing that its contradictory would overthrow that which has been already established or admitted. If the conclusion for which I contend be not true, its contradictory must be so in virtue of a fundamental law in logic. Make of this contradictory a premiss, instead of one already proved or granted. A conclusion will be the result contradictory of the latter. But that by hypothesis is true, therefore the substituted one must be false, and its contradictory, the position contended for, must be true.

This kind of reasoning is sometimes used by Euclid; and in logic, so long as reduction to the first figure was held necessary to the full establishment of a syllogism, it was applied for that purpose to the moods *baroco* and *bocardo*.

Accident. Gr. *συμβέβηκός*. That which *falls upon*, occurs to, anything, as distinguished from the thing itself. The word is used in two senses: First, to denote the fifth Predicable, the Accident as distinguished from the Genus, Differentia, Species, and Property (see **Predicable**); and secondly, as a name for all that is connected with anything, but external to its real or supposed substance, such as qualities, relations, habits, &c. (see **Substance**).

Act, Actual, opposed to **Potentiality**, and **Potential** or **Virtual** in the old sense of the latter term.

Actus is the Latin word employed by the schoolmen as an equivalent to the *ἐνέργεια* of Aristotle, and *potentialitas* stands with them for his *δύναμις*.

As he spoke of things that are *δύναμει* and things that are *ἐνέργειᾳ*, so they of things *in potentia* and things *in actu*. The latter term has survived in the adjective *actual* and the adverb *actually*. In our older writers, however, the substantive *act* was used, not as with us, for an individual *action*, but in the technical sense of the Aristotelian philosophy. For example, take this sentence of Hooker: “God alone excepted, who actually and everlastinglly is whatsoever He may be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now He is not; all other things are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not *in act*.”¹

This distinction between existing *δύναμει* and existing *ἐνέργειᾳ* occupies an important place in Aristotelian philosophy. He illustrates it by referring to the presence *δύναμει* of the statue in the marble, as opposed to the sculptured Mercury existing *ἐνέργειᾳ*, to the half in the whole which can be separated from it, and then have an actual existence of its own, to wakefulness in him that is asleep which has a potential but not an actual reality, and the like.

Potentiality must not be identified with possibility. In possessing these distinct terms Latin terminology has an advantage over Greek, unless

¹ *Eccl. Pol.* book I. v. 1.

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indeed we see the same distinction in the two words δύνατος and ἐνδέχομενός, when the latter is used in opposition to necessary. Though he is thrown on the word δύναμις and the adjective δύνατος, Aristotle is careful to note that nothing exists δύναμει of which the subject is not susceptible. Thus light has no potential existence in an inanimate thing, the finished statue none in water. Whereas anything is in one sense *possible* that does not involve contradiction.

Virtual and *Virtuality* were formerly synonymous with potential and potentiality. How these words came by their present, so different from their original, meaning, I know not. Johnson seemed aware of none but the present use, and failed to see that in the majority of his quotations the word is employed in its original one.

As there can be nothing potential in God, nothing that He might be, but is not, it has been well said that He is pure *act*.

The whole distinction between the potential and the *actual* is pregnant with consequence. It took a leading share in the theological controversies of the sixth century, and bears, as may be easily seen, on the whole question of original sin as distinguished from actual, the former being sin δύναμει, and the latter, as its name shows, sin ἐνέργειᾳ. It also enters into the subject of Nominalism and Realism. Perhaps its aid might tend to an adjustment of that dispute. “The species is *potentially* in the genus, the genus is *actually* in

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the species.”¹ On the same principle we must say that the individual the *res* is potentially in the universal, the universal is actually in the individual. The genus energises in species, the species in the specimen, the universal in the individual. The difference between Aristotle’s and the modern employment of the word *energy* must be carefully kept in mind. Even in his own day, however, it would appear that he used it in a wider sense than the ordinary. Ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἔστι τὸ δύναμις καὶ τὸ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν.² This remark would have been needless had the case been otherwise. In his use, however, οὐ μονον κινήσεώς ἔστι τὸ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας.

Active, Activity. See Power.

Aesthetic. A name originally given by German philosophers to the science of the beautiful, and of the fine arts, into which they have gone more deeply than any others. The word is derived from the Greek *aisthēsis*, *perception*, and is perhaps not a very happy one for the purpose to which it has been applied. It has, however, quite established itself.

Affection. The mode in which the mind is related to whatsoever acts on it, the mode in which it is *affected* by such. The ordinary conversational use of the word *affection* is much more limited in meaning, it being employed to denote but one class of affections, kindly regard or love other than that between the sexes.

¹ Lord Monboddo.

² *Metaph.* viii. 1.

Affirmation. A positive assertion of one thing regarding another, opposed to *negation*, which is a negative assertion of the like. In affirmation we either identify one term with another, or include one in another, thus pronouncing what Kant has called either *analytic* or *synthetic* judgments.

A fortiori. The argument *à fortiori*, from the stronger, consists in inferring from the greater case to the less, e. g. inferring the operation of a cause in a less difficult case from its operation in a more difficult one, the superiority or inferiority of one thing to another from its superiority or inferiority to that which is superior or inferior to it, and the like.

It has been pronounced impossible to exhibit *à fortiori* reasoning in regular syllogistic form, and such arguments have been even entitled syllogisms *without a middle term*. I have however maintained, and I venture to think proved the contrary.¹

A posteriori, A priori. The two counter forms of reasoning, resulting, the one from the action of things and events, i. e. from experience; the other from that which is already in the mind. We reason or judge *à posteriori* when we ascend from observation of particulars to a general law; we reason or judge *à priori* when we conclude on particulars from a previous principle already in our minds, whether there as the result of previous experience, or as a necessary form of thought. It is to the latter class of *à priori* judgments that

¹ *Outline of Logic*, 2nd ed. pp. 139-142.

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the term since Kant has been generally applied. When we pass, however, from single judgments to discourse, the title belongs to all *deductive*, and that of *à posteriori* to all inductive, reasoning.

Amphiboly. The ambiguity of a proposition, as distinguished from *homonymia*, the ambiguity of a term.

Examples :

- (a) Aio te *Æacida Romanos vincere posse.*
- (b) The Duke yet lives that Henry shall depose.

The Latin language is peculiarly exposed to amphiboly from the absence of articles, and the various admissible arrangement of words, in conjunction with the constant use of the infinitive at once governed by and governing an accusative. Kant employs the term in a sense of his own, as he has done in the case of other philosophical words. He denotes by it a confusion of the notions of the pure understanding with the perceptions of experience, and a consequent ascription to the latter of what belongs only to the former.

Analogy. This term does not mean the resemblance of things but of ratios. The things may have no likeness to each other. When we say that as the brain is to the human body, so is the government to the body politic, we never suppose resemblance between a tissue in the skull, and the members of a government, or between the human frame and the organized population of a state, but we do assert resemblance in the relations which respectively subsist between them.

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It is important to keep this distinction in mind, for otherwise we may fancy ourselves arguing from analogy when our reasoning is altogether futile. To infer that because two things are to each other as two other things are to each other, therefore these things are like or correspond in other particulars than those connected with this common ratio, is to infer without grounds. In order that what seems reasoning from analogy may be really such, the inference should be drawn from the ratio, and from nothing besides. In this case it will be, like all reasoning whatsoever, a syllogism, having for major that the results of a ratio may be expected in every case where such ratio subsists. In mathematics and arithmetic this syllogism leads of course to a necessary conclusion. In other matters it affords a probable one, but frequently so probable as to produce reasonable conviction.

The difference between real and seeming argument from analogy comes out very distinctly in men's applications of that which subsists between an individual man and a nation. These of course are many and various. One well known is to the effect that as in each man there is, after growth and the adult condition have had their turn, a law of decrepitude and decay which finally produces dissolution, we are to expect the like in a nation, and however great and noble it may at one time have been, it must in the course of ages succumb to an old age of feebleness, if it do not die and perish altogether.

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Now let us see what are the limits of the analogy between individual men and nations, so far as it is known to us. We do find the same ratio between the childhood and youth and the adult condition of a man, and the beginnings, early growth, and then complete development of a nation. We may therefore count on the results of that ratio appearing in the one case as well as the other; and as childhood is feeble and acts within very narrow limits, and youth is bold and eager, but crude and inexperienced, and both are thus distinguished from the harmonized vigour of experienced manhood, the like distinctions will be found between the character of a nation during its first beginnings, its period of growth, and its ripened greatness. But while we know that there is this common ratio of growth and full growth in the man and the nation, we do not know that there is the like between the vital action of the one and the vital action of the other, a vital action which in the one case at a certain time begins to expend more force than can be repaired, and must therefore come at last to an end, and in the other is supplied by elements of truth, morality, and religion, which need not wear out, though they too generally have done so. If we therefore affirm the mortality of a nation because of the mortality of a man, we are going beyond the bounds of the analogy, we are not arguing from the only known common ratio.

The value of the argument from analogy consists in its power of repelling objections, and of

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suggestion; both of which characteristics are presented in unstinted abundance to the student of Butler.

A sense of fallacy arises from metaphor, which is easily turned into analogy. No doubt a metaphor is a short analogy, but its purpose is only immediate and pictorial, and we abuse it if we reason from it. But much of human language is of necessity metaphorical, and therefore this danger is of continual occurrence. When the Emperor Nicholas termed Turkey "the sick man," he used a natural metaphor; but if he inferred from it that interference on the part of other nations or arrangement between them was expedient, he turned his metaphor into an argument from analogy.

Analysis. See **Method.**

Antecedent. Consequent. In hypothetical propositions the subject is called the *antecedent*, the predicate the *consequent*, e. g.

<i>Antecedent.</i>	<i>Consequent.</i>
If Cæsar aimed at a crown, he deserved to die.	

Anthropomorphism. The name of Anthropomorphites was given to a sect in the fourth century, called also from its founder Audians. Taking literally the passages of Scripture which speak of the eyes, hands, &c., of God, they maintained that irrespectively of the Incarnation of the Son, He has a body like the human. With this we have nothing at present to do. The word anthropomorphism is now used to denote thinking

[ANTHROPOMORPHISM.]

of God as in any way in the likeness of man, ascribing to Him attributes and modes of mind and feeling of which we are conscious in ourselves and which we observe in others.

To do this is natural, and the doing it characterizes a great deal of the idolatry of heathendom. In fact, as polytheism is the breach of the first, so is anthropomorphism a breach, and probably the most prevalent breach, of the second commandment, a breach of which numbers who never dreamt of bowing to stock and stone are continually guilty. By transferring their own habitual thoughts and feelings to the Being of beings, they make a mental likeness of Him to things in earth, i. e. to themselves. “To whom then will ye liken Me, or shall I be equal? saith the Holy One.”

Even the heathen philosopher could see the folly of this, and proclaim that God must not be conceived in the likeness of man, any more than of other created things. And so strongly is this felt by some, that they shrink from ascribing to Him anything that can render Him a real object of thought to ourselves.

Here, then, we encounter a serious difficulty. If we do not contemplate God as angry, or pitying, or loving, in any sense in the same way as we are angry, as we pity, or we love, we do not contemplate anything at all. When we think of anger, pity, or love, we cannot escape the bounds of our own experience, consciousness, and being, so as

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really to think of anger, pity, or love, in no degree corresponding to these things in ourselves. The philosopher already referred to has some well-known verses to the effect that if the lion, or the ox, or the horse could draw an image of the gods, it would be respectively great lions, great oxen, or great horses.¹ And even so, protest against it as we like, when God is an object to our minds at all, we are forced to view Him as the concentration and sublimation of all the greatness and goodness we have ever known in man. What, then, is to be done? Is there no choice between a vicious anthropomorphism and practical atheism?

I believe the clue to a solution of this difficulty is to be found by exactly reversing the anthropomorphic process, and viewing not a God fashioned in the likeness of man, but man made as we are told he is, in the image and likeness of God. And though on first hearing this, it may be natural to exclaim "That comes to the same thing," yet a little consideration will show that the practical issues of the two processes are very different. The first may too easily lend itself to representing God in the likeness of that in man which the second would not lead us to recognise as part of

¹ Άλλ εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἰχον βόες ἡὲ λέοντες
*Η γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἀπερ ἄνδρες,
*Ιπποι μέν θ' ιπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουοὺν δμοὶς
Καὶ κε θεῶν ίδεας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
Τοιαῦθ οἷον περ καντοὶ δέμας εἰχον δμοῖον.

Xenophanes apud Clem. Alex. Stromata.

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the image of God. The second will preserve us from *ea cogitandi ratio perversæ, qua imperfecti aliquid ad Deum transfertur*, and yet enable us to view Him as really personal, as really angry, really pitying, really loving. Most true are the words of Jacobi that God in creating man His image *theomorphized*, and therefore man is compelled to *anthropomorphize*; and justly does he say that without such anthropomorphism which is ever regarded as real Theism, we are left to the alternative of fetishism or atheism. We must ever be on our guard against attempts to magnify God, which practically annihilate Him as an object to our minds and hearts.

Need I say that the Incarnation has for ever solved the difficulty? When we bring home to ourselves and remember the great declaration, "he that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," we shall be encouraged to believe that whatever is *really human* in us has its counterpart in God, only there in its fulness and perfection, and free from all the accidents wherewith it is limited, blurred over, and disfigured in us.

These considerations may throw some light on a point capable of giving birth to difficulty. It is part of the received theology to speak of God as *without passions* (Art. i.). And whoever reflects on what we mean by passions, feelings and influences produced by *being acted upon*, will be found to acquiesce in the statement, to this extent at least, that God cannot be acted on save in so far as

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by His own choice and appointment He permits Himself to be, as for example in His relations to moral creatures. But we must not infer from this, that because wrath and love are passions in us, they have no existence in God. In Him they really and fully are, only in Him they are not passions, but are His very being, the actuation of His own perfection.

Antinomy. By this title Kant denotes contradictory results at which the pure reason arrives, on matters transcending experience, not by paralogism, but in virtue of its own laws. Of these he gives four, the contrary members of which he calls respectively the thesis and the antithesis.

1st Thesis. The world is eternal and infinite.

Antithesis. There is a beginning in time and a limit to space.

2nd Thesis. There are simple substances.

Antithesis. Everything is compounded.

3rd Thesis. There is above all things a cause that is absolutely free.

Antithesis. All is subjected to fixed laws.

4th Thesis. There exists necessary being.

Antithesis. All is contingent.

There is also an antinomy of the practical reason. Virtue and blessedness constitute an inviolable harmony. Virtue and blessedness in many things are mutually exclusive. This antinomy is not, however, like those of the pure reason, unconquerable. The prospect of a future life reconciles the contradiction.

A parte ante, A parte post. These terms are used to denote respectively the two notions of eternity in the past and eternity in the future. These notions involve contradiction, inasmuch as the thought of eternity involves the illimitable, and the present constitutes a limit both to the past and the future. For the former, if we mean by the past eternity, infinite time, we make it impossible that the present or any given moment should ever be arrived at. For the latter, as we must start from the present, we must substitute for the idea of eternity that of an endless future.

This contradiction results from giving eternity the definition of *infinite time*, whereas it means independence of time, a state in which all is alike present, a state which can never be that of the creature, who can be endued with immortality, but cannot, like the high and the lofty One, *inhabit eternity*. The constant *present* of the latter has been entitled the *nunc stans* of eternity.

Apodeictic. Demonstrative. i. e. reasoning which is of necessary force, and such as cannot be rejected by the mind that understands and follows its process. In mathematics not only is the reasoning of this kind, but the matter on which it is employed is necessary also. In logic the matter may be necessary, contingent, or even false, but the reasoning will be necessary or *apodeictic*, if the principles of the science have been obeyed. The premisses of a syllogism may be questionable or false, but if it be a pure and

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valid syllogism, the links between them and the conclusion will be adamantine.

Apprehension. See **Conception.**

Archetype. The plan or model to which any given thing is entirely or approximately conformed. In this sense it is equivalent to the Platonic idea. But the word is comparatively rare, and Johnson, who has admitted in his *Dictionary* many worse ones, takes no notice of this. Locke and Watts use it in quite another sense from that just given. With them the object represented in our idea of it (the word idea being understood in their acceptation) is the *archetype* of the idea. Over and above this, Locke uses the word in a sense still more removed from its true meaning. He calls complex ideas which have no counterpart in real existence *archetypal*.

Argument. This is a word used in a variety of senses. Often, it denotes the whole of a reasoning. Every syllogism is in this sense an argument. Frequently in conversation it denotes a disputation. Such is really not one argument, but two. Each party is pursuing and urging his own argument. In the technical language of logic, the *argument* frequently meant not the whole syllogism, but the middle term, by which the former was constituted.

Argumentum ad hominem. An argument which, whatever it be in itself, or however inoperative on others, is of constraining effect on the person to whom it is addressed, either because based on

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some principle for which he himself contends, or on the general maxims which regulate his conduct. Butler's *Analogy* is such an argument, being addressed to the Deist; and the Atheist or Pantheist might admit its validity, but deny that it has any bearing on their positions.

Argumentum in terrorem. Argument into terror.

One that appeals to fear.

Argumentum ad verecundiam. An appeal to shame.

Art. The power of producing anything. When we quit the region of ordinary handicrafts which we do not often dignify with the title of Arts, we find it difficult to distinguish between an art and a science. For the possession of the method by which anything is produced, means to imply less or more of science of which the mastery of method is the very essence, the knowledge not merely of the *ōrū* but of the *euōrū*. Accordingly the same pursuit has been called by some a science and by some an art, and even Aristotle, who has laid down the distinction with great clearness, has not succeeded in always observing it. In the concluding chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* he tells us that many recollections constitute one experience *ēμπειρία*, and that an universal being established in the mind through experience, a sense of the one over and above the many, of that one which is the same in the several particulars, we have the principle of art and science—of art if the case be a matter of production, of science if it

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be one of existence, i.e. of the knowledge of reality : *εἰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν*. Yet in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, cap. i., when contrasting art with new experience, we find him pronouncing the former to be science.

The case stands thus : Art and science are distinct in the abstract, but in the concrete the pursuit of the former involves science, and he who follows it is engaged in studies and investigations which must be called scientific.

Arts, the Fine. We thus entitle such arts as have for their aim the exhibition of things in their ideal, and therefore the production of beauty. So long as mere utility or convenience is the end, we deny this rank to an art ; I say *mere* utility or convenience, for it may be both an utilitarian and a fine art, as for example architecture. The labourer in the mechanical, we call an *artizan* ; in the fine arts, we style the presiding worker the *ἀρχιτέκτων*, an *artist*. See **Aesthetic**.

Arts, the Liberal. The studies which formed the *trivium* and the *Quadrivium* of the schools. Hence the titles *Bachelor of Arts* and *Master of Arts*. The word *artist* down to the seventeenth century denoted, not as now, the worker in the fine arts, but the proficient in the liberal. So, too, *artizan* denoted one whom we should now call *artist*.¹

Atom, Atomism, from the Greek *ἄτομος*, which means both that which is uncut and that which is incapable of being cut or divided. In the latter sense it is in Greek equivalent to the Latin

¹ TRENCH's *Select Glossary*, pp. 8, 9.

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individual, and as such is used by Aristotle. As applied to time, it denotes in the New Testament *a moment*. With regard to matter, we mean by it indivisible portions thereof, and the name **atomism** is given to the various theories of the universe which suppose it constituted by combinations of such, theories represented by Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, and revived in modern times by Gassendi, without however the atheism which characterized them in the old world. The **Monads** of Leibnitz will demand some distinct notice. See **Monad**.

Attribute, Attributive. The *attribute*, as its name imports, is that which is ascribed to anything. Hence it is the French term for the *predicate*. It is not, however, a very happy one, for it naturally denotes no more than the ascription of quality, or affirmation of accident, but does not readily include negation. Neither is it easily applied to the reciprocating or substitutive proposition. The French are consequently obliged to distinguish between the *attribut logique*, and the *attribut metaphysique*, and even then they do not get over the disadvantage of the term.

We are forced by the necessities of thought and language to speak of the Divine *Attributes*, such as goodness, wisdom, omnipotence, &c. It must always be remembered in thus applying the word that we are denoting no accidents, but that each of these is of the essence of Godhead.

Attributive is a name given to the proposition *de inesse*, in which we refer the subject to a class,

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i.e. predicate of it some quality or accident. This is, to speak the language of Kant, the *synthetic* as contrasted with the *analytic* judgment. The latter is identical with the *reciprocating* or *substitutive* proposition just mentioned, in which the subject and predicate are commensurate and convertible, and in which *attribut*, as we have seen, is not a felicitous name for the latter.

Autonomy. From *αὐτὸς* and *νόμος*. The being *a law to itself*. A term of Kant's to denote the absolute and universal degree of the will on the side of right and duty. He opposes to it *heteronomy*, laws imposed on us externally or by the lower elements of our being, such as appetites and passions, which are outside the will. See **Categorical Imperative**.

Axiom. This term taken by Aristotle from Mathematics, whether from the language of others, or from his own lost writings on that subject, is claimed by him for Metaphysics or Ontology as well. It denotes an immediate self-evident proposition, which does not admit of proof, but from which proof proceeds. Boëthius and the schoolmen render it, out of regard to its etymology, by *dignitas*.

Aristotle lays stress upon the distinction between the general axioms which are common to all science, and those which are proper to any one. The former as applied to geometry are called *κοινὰ ἀνοιαὶ* by Euclid, and the rest of those named axioms in our versions are by him placed among the postulates *ἀρχῆματα*.

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So far the Aristotelian notion of an *axiom*, which is perhaps the most generally entertained. The term, however, has been variously applied. The Stoicks gave the name to every general proposition, as does Bacon, who even speaks of arriving at or *exciting* axioms, and proving them. Kant restricts the title to the fundamental axioms of geometry, our pure intuitions of space. The Cartesians follow the Aristotelian use, i. e. the use in the *Analytics* and *Metaphysics*. In the eighth book of *Topics* the word has a wider latitude, which seems the most adapted to general philosophy.

Meaning then by axioms the fundamental, universal, and self-evident judgments on which all thought must hinge, such as that if equals be added to equals the sums will be equal, and the like, Aristotle resolves them all into the great logical law of Contradiction, that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. By denying therefore an axiom truly such we subvert thought, and turn all exercise of it into futility. Those who understand the distinction will see that in this view they are to be regarded as *analytic* not *synthetic* judgments. Kant, confining the term to geometrical intuitions, classes them with the latter. There are several questions respecting axioms over and above those which relate to the use of the term, on which I cannot enter here. The most modern of these will be found in Stewart's works, and in Mill's *Logic*.

Casuistry. The science of right and wrong as applied to the various cases in which the con-

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science may be in doubt. This has been much pursued in the Roman Catholic Church, particularly by the Jesuits. It survived the Reformation among ourselves. Perhaps its last eminent votaries were Bishops Jeremy Taylor and Sanderson. It has now fallen into pretty general disuse, and I venture to think rightly. "The primal duties shine aloft like stars," and about them "the upright heart and pure" will not admit a moment's doubt. Outside these there are, however, cases in which a man may honestly be perplexed as to his duty, and as such cases involve contingent matter and circumstances peculiar to themselves, it is difficult to see how any science can antecedently provide for them. The evils in which having recourse to the authorities in such a science will I think result, are the production either of a morbid or a too easily satisfied conscience. Where the question of duty is perplexing, honest self-examination, due exercise of the judgment, and prayer to God, will be the true means of securing right guidance. Of course the presentation of the case to another mind will, when practicable, be often serviceable, but even then I should prefer the judgment of a faithful friend, and better still that of a pure-hearted woman, a sister or a wife, to that of any doctor in casuistry. See **Categorical Imperative**.

Category. The word *κατηγορία* originally meant accusation. Aristotle, however, used the verb *κατηγορέω* to denote the art of predicating affirma-

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tively. Hence with him *το κατηγορούμενον* means *the predicate*, and as all predication must fall under some one of the necessary conditions and relations of things, he calls these latter the *Categories*, and for the same reason the Latins entitled them *Predicaments*.

Aristotle makes them ten in number.

- | | |
|---------------|-------------|
| 1. Substance. | 6. Passion. |
| 2. Quantity. | 7. Place. |
| 3. Quality. | 8. Time. |
| 4. Relation. | 9. Posture. |
| 5. Action. | 10. Habit. |

These are *summa genera* of conception under which all nations, judgments, and classifications must be ranged. There are, however, ideas behind and beyond them, such as *existence*, *good*, and the *like*, which in the language of the schools are called *transcendents* and *transcendentals*—terms which Kant used in quite different senses (see **Transcendent** and **Transcendental**). Indeed he also used the word *category* in a sense different from the old one.

Aristotle's division has long been objected to as a cross one. *Relation* obviously includes *posture*, *place*, and *time*, if indeed it does not comprehend every category except *substance*. *Habit* too, as is acknowledged in the treatise on the categories, comes under *quality*. There have been many classifications of categories from the Stoics down to Sir W. Hamilton, which the reader may find and consider for himself. Meanwhile, let it be said

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that if the Aristotelian division be formally defective, it would be difficult to convict it of being other than exhaustive. The word *category*, as I have said, is employed by Kant in a sense different from the Aristotelian. He bestows the title on what he deems necessary and *à priori* forms of the understanding, whereas the categories of Aristotle are classifications of *à posteriori* notions and knowledge quite as much as, if not rather more than, of *à priori*.

If Kant has thus changed the philosophical sense of the word *category*, modern language has equally done so in another way. It is now continually used for *class* of any kind. When one considers how many words we have synonymous with class, it is difficult to account for men going out of their way and getting hold of *category*, except by a sickly preference for a long and grand word, over a short and familiar one, especially if the former have a philosophical air. The impropriety of entitling any class whatever a *category* will appear if we substitute the Latin *predicament*. Common as this misuse of the word *category* has become, I think it may still be avoided with advantage. The benefit of technical terms is impaired by using them in various senses.

Categorical. In Aristotle the adjective *κατηγορίκος* means *affirmative* as opposed to *στερητικός*. His immediate followers, however, introduced that use of the word which has obtained ever since, and according to which a categorical proposition means a simple and direct affirmation or denial,

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as opposed to a conditional, hypothetical, or disjunctive one.

Categorical Imperative. A term used by Kant in his *Critique of the Practical Reason*, to denote its *à priori* absolute and universal pronouncement in favour of moral good and duty. It is *à priori*, and therefore independent of prudential considerations, which can only be the result of experience, and being *à priori* it is necessary and universal. This is a fundamental truth in morals, and rests on what Kant calls the *autonomy of the will* (see **Autonomy**). It is plain, however, that this categorical imperative can only apply to the general ideas of right and duty, or to cases which unmistakably come under the express commandment of God, and the consent of the Catholic conscience. In cases where an honest mind may be in doubt, cases involving contingent considerations, and mixed up with circumstances peculiar to themselves, the judgment must be exercised. When it is conscientiously exercised, with of course a faithful recourse to all means within reach of arriving at a right decision, the resulting conduct may admit of question, but the man has done right. The *flat* of conscience, as has been well observed, is not *do this* but *be this*. In a doubtful case we are to determine as we best may whether *doing this* does or does not come under the head of *being this*.

Cause. That without which something else could not exist, which something else is called the *effect*.

Aristotle, as is well known, divided causes into

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four kinds: the *formal cause*,¹ the *material*,² the *efficient*,³ and the *final*.⁴ The third, the efficient, is the agency whereby the effect is produced; the second, the material, the matter in which it is produced; the first, the formal, the distinctive characteristics in virtue of which it is what it is; the fourth, the *final*, the end for which it is called into being. Thus the efficient cause of the Venus di Medici was the tool guided by the sculptor's hand, the material the marble, the formal being a statue of Venus, and the final to be a representation of Venus, or to be an object in which Venus might be worshipped, or to give delight as an exhibition of the loveliness of which Venus is conceived as the representative. The beginner is apt to be puzzled on hearing all these four ranked as causes. He is apt to think the formal cause identical with the thing itself, and viewing all cause as prior in time to the effect, he cannot see the propriety of such a title as *final cause*. Yet if he think for a moment, he will see that the final cause, the end to be effected, must have been antecedent in the design to the effect. This classification, however, has not remained a mere difficulty to the beginner. Reid, without gravely objecting to it, considers the term cause to be used in it ambiguously, and therefore denies that the four are species under one genus. To this

¹ τὸ τι ἔνι ξίναται.

² ἡ ὀλη, *Metaph.* i. 3. τὸ τινῶν οὐτῶν ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ξίναται. *Analyt. Post.* ii. 11.

³ ἡ τι πρωτογενὴς.

⁴ τὸ τινος ξένεκα, *Analyt. Post.* τὸ δὲ ξένεκα, *Metaph.*

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Hamilton justly replies that the coincidence of the four is a necessary condition, a *sine quā non* to the production of the effect.

Bacon, as is well known, pronounced final causes to be like virgins consecrated to God, barren—barren, that is, of practical inventions and operations. In its proper place he treats inquiry into them with no disrespect, but complains only of the injury which it has done to physical research by distracting men from due search after efficient and material causes.

The metaphysical difficulties and controversies of later days respecting causation are connected solely with *efficient* causes. Into these I do not enter at present. I will content myself with urging on those who do not try to decompose the essential structure of the mind and thereby turn all speculation into futility, and who, abiding in consequence by the elementary forms of thought, believe that there is a real relation between cause and effect, the following considerations.

Every efficient cause which comes within our observation is itself an effect, as *its* cause in its turn will be found to be. Unless, then, the chain is endless, there must be an ultimate or first cause (for either term is used according to the *terminus a quo* of thought). Further, the immediate effect with which we are concerned is the result of many causes. Each of these as we ascend is the effect of fewer, so that mounting higher and higher we are compelled to believe that the first cause, the cause of causes, is one.

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The efficient causes which are between the effect and the first cause, are called *secondary causes*.

Causes, occasional. In the Cartesian philosophy this title is given to interventions of Deity to render causes productive of effects, which have themselves no relation to each other. The seeming causes having no intrinsic power are called *occasional causes*, as being but the *occasions* of the Divine interventions, which are the real ones. I apprehend the whole theory to have now died away, at least as put forth by the Cartesians. What has been said above on the first cause applies uniformly, and therefore dispenses with it. It was thought needful, however, to explain the action of soul on body, and that of body on soul.

Class, Classification. The former of these words denotes any group of several individuals, whatever be the principle on which they are ranged together, and is what is now so often absurdly called a category. A class may be either a species or genus, according as it contains or is contained by another class or classes. In the technical language, however, of Natural History, convenience dictates separate names for the several ranks of subaltern, genera, and species, such as *order*, *genus*, *species*, &c.; and *class* there stands for a very high and extensive genus, such as the class *mammalia* in zoology, and the class *cryptogamia* in botany.

Classification is the arranging individuals in classes or groups, and this may be done quite arbi-

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trarily, or by selecting characteristics at pleasure, or by looking for such as are permanent and essentially connected with the objects which we place together because of them. The last-named method is alone scientific, and the great classificatory sciences which we name collectively Natural History, not only demand methods strictly logical, such as good division and definition, but insight into essential characteristics, and the subordination of one set of such to another. It is in this latter respect that the botanical system introduced by Jussieu is so superior to that of Linnæus, the one being as it is called the *natural*, the other the *artificial* method.

Comprehension. This term is used in logic to denote the aggregate of qualities, the counter term *extension* denoting the number of objects, contained in a notion. Thought necessarily proceeds in these two directions. When I proceed in the latter I refer the perceived object to its species *A*, and that to its genus *B*, of each of which it is in that regard a part; but when I proceed in the former direction, that of comprehension, I view *A* and *B* as parts of the object. In respect of extension, *B* contains *A*, and *A* the object. In respect of comprehension, *A* contains *B*, and the object contains both.

The term *comprehension* labours under this disadvantage, that it would be quite natural to use it for extension, and Archbishop Whately actually does so. Accordingly it has been proposed to

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substitute for it the word *intension*. The two counter-wholes have likewise been denoted by the terms *breadth* and *depth*, the generic extension giving us the former, the qualities comprised in the object giving us the latter. In spite of all this, however, the names *comprehension* and *extension* hold their ground.

Concept, Conception. Conception is the faculty, and also the act, of forming a notion of the perceived object. Mere perception would not amount to this. Plainly it would do no more than reveal to us the existence of something external to the perceiving mind, would do nothing towards an answer to the question *what* that object is. Conception has been called by most English logical writers by the name of *apprehension*. Both are sufficiently significant, but conception has a larger grasp, and gives us the paronym *concept*, so that it is on the whole to be preferred. It is good to have separate words for a faculty, and an individual product of such faculty. Accordingly concept has been of late introduced to denote a separate act of conception. I should rather say *re-introduced*, for it was thus employed by our older writers in the form *conceit*. That which is essentially the same word with *concept* has, however, gone into another groove of meaning, and consequently could not be conveniently revived in its old sense.

A concept expressed is called a *term*, whether consisting of one word or of several.

Conceptualism. The ground taken by Abelard, Ockham, and others, in opposition to extreme nominalism on the one hand, and realism on the other. See **Nominalism** and **Realism**.

Concrete. See **Abstract**, **Abstraction**.

Conscience, Consciousness. Self-Consciousness. Etymologically considered, these words mean the same thing. *Conscientia* in Latin corresponds both in formation and meaning to *συνέδησις* in Greek. In the former language it sometimes denotes the joint knowledge of several people, e. g. of those engaged in a conspiracy. When used, however, for an affection of the individual mind, it has for the most part the ethical meaning which is ordinary with us, i. e. it signifies the faculty of moral judgment.

Conscience, however, in French and Italian has a larger import, and denotes the whole of what we call *consciousness*. Indeed, it seems in former days to have done so in English, being that used both by Hooker and Bacon.¹ Now, however, we avail ourselves of the two words, the generic term *consciousness* to denote the whole exercise of the mind's reflex action whereby it both feels and knows, and knows that it feels and knows, and the specific term *conscience* to denote that particular action of the former whereby it recognises the moral character of everything which we feel, say, or do, which is susceptible of such character.

¹ See JOHNSON'S *Dictionary*. I more than doubt, however, his being justified in assigning this sense to *conscience* as used by Bacon; nor am I clear that any of his quotations bear him out except that from Hooker.

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It has been disputed whether consciousness is a faculty or action separable from feeling, perceiving, or knowing. To say that *I feel* and that *I am conscious of feeling*, seems saying the very same thing ; and so to feel something and be conscious of feeling that thing constitute but one mental state. Sir W. Hamilton, who takes this view in opposition to Reid and Stewart, thus happily explains this difference in words where there is no difference in reality : "We require different words, not only to express objects and relations different in themselves, but to express the same objects and relations under the different points of view in which they are placed by the mind when scientifically considering them. Thus, in the present instance, consciousness and knowledge are not distinguished by different words as different things, but only as the same thing considered in different aspects. The verbal distinction is taken for the sake of brevity and precision, and its convenience warrants its establishment. Knowledge is a relation, and every relation supposes two terms. Thus, in the relation in question, there is, on the one hand, a subject of knowledge,—that is, the knowing mind,—and on the other, there is an object of knowledge,—that is, the thing known ; and the knowledge itself is the relation between these two terms. Now though each term of a relation necessarily supposes the other, nevertheless one of these terms may be to us the more interesting, and we may consider that term as the principal, and view

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the other only as subordinate and correlative. Now, this is the case in the present instance. In an act of knowledge, my attention may be principally attracted either to the object known, or to myself as the subject knowing ; and in the latter case, although no new element be added to the act, the condition involved in it,—*I know that I know*,—becomes the primary and prominent matter of consideration."

Self-Consciousness. This is something distinct from mere consciousness. The latter I concur with Sir W. Hamilton in considering identical with thought and feeling, and therefore it cannot be denied, I think, to the brute creation. But *self-consciousness*, as the term is used, implies the sense of personal identity, of a permanent *ego*; and we have no evidence that the brute has such as a permanent habit of his mind. He *recollects* an object on occasion of its renewed presence, but if he *remembers* anything in its absence, he does not seem to do so further than in the way of missing that to which he is used, and which he wishes to find.¹ Even with men, self-consciousness varies much both in degree and power. Whole races seem to have much less of it than others, and to its comparative weakness we may, I think, ascribe the indifference to life independent of personal courage, exhibited by the Eastern Asiatic. And we see like variation among the

¹ Das Dämmerleben der Thierheit und der dumpfbrütende, seelische und doch bewusstlose character derselben, &c.

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men of the same race; nay, in the same man at different times. Daily accustomed actions, such as the successive steps of dressing and undressing, are gone through without reflection upon them; whereas either thought, word, or work, to which aught of moral character belongs, is always accompanied by less or more of it. I cannot see that conscience in our ordinary ethical sense of the term is more than self-consciousness of moral condition; but it is so far distinguished from other manifestations of the faculty, that it is always exercised when its materials, i. e. the right or wrong of our doings and characters, are presented. By this I do not mean that many men are not habitually guilty of wrong with undisturbed consciences; but this is because the sense of such wrong has not been awakened within them, or has been benumbed and killed. If they know what they do to be wrong, their conscience will pass judgment on it, however such judgment may be disobeyed.

Consequent. See **Antecedent.**

Contingent. This is the Latin equivalent to the ἐνδεχόμενον of Aristotle. This term, by his own admission, is used in different senses. He himself adopts it to express whatever may be stated with truth but is not necessary. He divides it into two heads, the ἐνδεχόμενον when something is predicated ἀπὸ τύχης, and the ἐνδεχόμενον when something is predicated ὡς ἐπὶ τό πολύ. In the first case no impossibility stands in the way of

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the thing being true, but no necessity makes it so ; in the second the thing *is* true, but not necessarily so. In the one case, the thing may or not be ; there may or may not be a sea-fight to-morrow ; a man digging in a field may or may not chance upon a treasure ; in the other, the thing is generally true, as that a man's hair turns grey, if he lives into latter life, but the man may not be forthcoming, or he may prove an exception to the rule.

The ἐνδεχόμενον of Aristotle is, as I have said, rendered in Latin by *contingens*, and from that by us *contingent*. A threefold division, but based on what Aristotle laid down, was subsequently made. The contingent was either

1st. *In plurimum*, equivalent to the ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ πολύ.

2ndly. When the thing happens ἀπὸ τύχης, *a fortuna*, as in the case of the man digging a field and finding a treasure. This is often the negative of the former, the rare as opposed to the usual, the exceptions from the general truth of the *in plurimum*.

3rdly. The *ad utrumlibet*, when the thing supposed may or may not be, as there may or may not be a sea-fight to-morrow.

In Aristotle the *contingent* is regarded mainly in its logical aspect and bearing. He inquires into its effect upon propositions and syllogisms. It is plain that thus regarded the *contingent proposition*, the proposition which asserts contingency of

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probable matter, is always true, whichever of the three kinds of contingency be predicated.

In this logical relation contingency is one of the *modals*, and modality gave birth to the most arduous and intricate parts of logical exercise. It is now very generally discarded as alien to the pure science, belonging to the matter not to the form of thought, the latter the form remaining unaffected by the modal, whether the necessary, the impossible, the possible, or the contingent, of the judgments which come under its review.

The word *contingent* is, however, often used in a wider and more important sense, not wholly unconnected indeed with those which have just passed under review, but referring to the matter more than to the form of thought, belonging more to the sphere of metaphysics than of logic. In this case it is applied to anything or any fact, which, however convinced of it we may be, we can conceive as non-existent, or as other than what it really is, anything the denial of which implies no contradiction, anything which is true, not by *necessity*, but because it *happens* to be true, i. e. is only *thought* of as happening to be true. Trendelenburg defines it thus : "Das Wirkliche, das nicht nothwendig ist, oder richtiger, *nicht als nothwendig angesehen wird*." In this wide sense the *contingent* means the whole world of the concrete, all that makes itself known to us not purely by our own thought about it, but by experience from without. Thus the world itself

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has been called a contingency, and the existence of God inferred à *contingentiâ mundi*.¹

In this perhaps now the predominant sense of the word, it is plain that it needs involve no element of uncertainty in that to which it is applied. The difference between necessity and contingency has been laid down as consisting in the degree of our conviction.² It would be better said to consist in the *grounds* of our conviction, our certainty of a necessary truth resulting from demonstration, and therefore such as could not be done away with or lessened without making thought contradict itself; our certainty (if the case be so) of a contingent truth being derived from considerations which, however cogent, could be questioned without such contradiction.

In this large sense of the word, contingency may be applied to a past event as well as a future. The past, indeed, is pronounced by Aristotle to be *necessary*, and so it is as opposed to some of his uses of the term ἐνδεχόμενον. But in the acceptance of the term *contingent* with which we are now engaged, it is plain that a past event is viewed as true only because it *happened* and could be supposed not to have happened.

Again, the *contingent* does not involve the *for-*

¹ In the previous views of contingency, we speak of *contingent judgments* or *propositions*, in that with which we are now engaged of *contingent truths*.

² THOMSON'S *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, second edition, p. 302.

CONTINGENT.]

tuitus. Aquinas and Calvin both view contingent events as pre-ordained by God as much as necessary ones.

“Si sic est, cum jam ab æterno divina Providentia sit in actu determinata respectu omnium, et immutabilis et infallibilis, &c.—sequitur quod, *de facto*, omnia *inevitabiliter* eveniant, quamvis quædam *contingenter*, et quædam *necessario* actus eveniens est *simpliciter* (id est, omnibus consideratis) *inevitabilis*, et secundum *quid* (id est, solitarie sumptus) *evitabilis*.¹”

The distinction here taken between an event viewed *omnibus consideratis*, and the same *solitarie sumptus*, is important. That which seen merely in itself is thought of as contingent, might well be found necessary, could we view it in connection with the great whole of which it forms a part.

Contradiction. **Contradictory.** See **Opposition.**
Contrary. See **Opposition.**

Converse, Conversion. Conversion in logic means the reversal of a proposition's polarity, so that what was the subject becomes the predicate, and *vice versa*. It is distinct from inversion as being a logical, whereas that is merely a rhetorical process. In inversion the subject and the predicate remain each what it was, but their usual places are changed, and this when the inversion is natural and justifiable gives emphasis, especially to the predicate. Thus it comes spon-

¹ Cajetan, quoted in notes to HAMILTON's *Reid*, p. 980.

CONVERSE.]

taneously in rhetorical or poetical utterance. Thus “few, few shall part where many meet.” Here *few* is the predicate, but has great emphasis, not being in its natural position. The aim of conversion, on the other hand, is to present a judgment essentially one with that first arrived at, but in a different light, and is thus one of the forms of *immediate inference*, i. e. inference not requiring any aid from the discursive process, from the interposition of another judgment, as in syllogism.

Copula. The part of a proposition, be it one word or more, which connects or *couples* the subject and the predicate.

In the modern languages, when propositions are stated in pure logical shape, the part of the copula is generally performed by the verb substantive, “Man is fallible.” By Aristotle a logical proposition is generally expressed thus: τὸ Αὐτός ρχει παντὶ τῷ B, though he has other ways of indicating it.

The copula *me saltem judice* is of no account in pure logic, is no real element in the judgment or proposition. That I think consists merely of the two terms, subject and predicate, and all that is wanted, and that by no means universally, is some symbol, it may be algebraic, to indicate their connection, and their quality, positive or negative.

The copula, however, is not viewed thus by all logicians. Some consider the quality of the pro-

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position to have its seat there, in which case of course it is a matter of pure logic; others consider modality to be expressed by it, a notion to which the Greek gave birth more naturally than do the languages of modern Europe. See **Modality**.

Corollary. This term is seldom used but in mathematics. Its Greek equivalent is *πόρισμα*. The origin of the Latin term, which means a little garland, in this sense is not very apparent. Anyhow the meaning is familiar to everyone acquainted with Euclid—so familiar that one cannot but wonder at Johnson's strange definition, “Corollary — A conclusion, whether following necessarily from the premisses or not.”

It really means a proposition necessarily resulting from a previous demonstration, distinct from the conclusion of that, but yet to which that is applicable, and no intermediate step requisite. Thus that every equilateral triangle must be equiangular, is a corollary from the conclusion of Prop. v. b. i. of Euclid. That is, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, and any two angles of an equilateral are angles at the base of an isosceles triangle.

The word *corollary* seems to have been formerly used in unscientific language in the mere senses of *redundancy* or *supplement*. Thus Shakespeare in the ‘*Tempest*’:

“ Now come, my Ariel, bring a *corollary*
Rather than want a spirit.”

And Dryden in the conclusion of the Preface to

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his Fables, “as a *corollary* to this preface, in which I have done justice to others, I owe somewhat to myself.”

Deduction. Reasoning from a more to a less general principle, as opposed to induction, where we reason from the less to the more general, from particulars to universals. See **Induction**.

Definition. Marking out something from everything else, the primary meaning of the Latin verb *definio* being to trace out a boundary.

Distinctions have been drawn between nominal and real definition, and the latter has been divided into essential and accidental. But with such distinctions pure logic has nothing to do. All that it looks to is the definition of a concept, or, coming to the same thing, of a term which is the expression of a concept. And this is procured by assigning to it the genus and the difference. Given the genus to which that denoted by a term belongs, and the difference between it and the other species of the genus, and we have its definition. The notion is presented to us definite and circumscribed, and all that we know or can discover about it will come within this enclosure.

As the differentia is itself a generic notion, it might be viewed as the genus, and the other elements of the definition as the species, e. g. *red-flowering currant*. Here we should ordinarily think and speak of currant as the genus and red-flowering as the species. But it is plainly possible, if we happen to be thinking of the effect of colour

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in flowers, to view *red-flowering* as the genus, having for its species roses and many others, amongst which will be currant. And this consideration will bring us to the simple and ultimate view of definition, which shows it to consist of the coincidence of two genera at a given place, thus producing depth as well as breadth in our notion, giving it solidity and determinate character.

It is plain that only species is definable. The genus to which we refer it may no doubt be defined also, but only by calling in the aid of a higher genus in which it is contained, and so viewing it as a species. The *summum genus* obviously cannot be defined, for want at once of a differentia and of a genus higher than itself; nor can the *individual*, as that presents us with no adequate differentia.

Definitions have, exclusively of those called *nominal*, with which science has nothing to do, been divided into *real* and *genetic*. The real definition is of the thing viewed as already existing, e.g. "A circle is a line returning upon itself, of which all the parts are equidistant from a given point." The genetic definition is of the process by which the thing comes into being, e.g. "A circle is formed when we draw around, and always at the same distance from, a fixed point, a movable point which leaves its trace, until the termination of the movement coincides with the commencement."¹

¹ HAMILTON, *Logic*, vol. ii. pp. 12, 18.

Deism. Viewed etymologically, this word would be regarded as synonymous with theism, being formed from the Latin, as that is from the Greek. We use the terms, however, in different senses. By theism we mean the acknowledgment of a God without implying the absence of any further faith ; by *deism* the admission of a God, but rejection of any revelation further than may be afforded by the light of Nature. Deism was the form generally taken by infidelity in the last century, and it is against deism that the arguments of Butler's *Analogy* are directed.

Demonstration. That absolute proof, which shows not only that a thing is so, but that it cannot be otherwise. It is of course confined to necessary matter, which belongs only to mathematics and logic. The laws and properties of pure space in geometry are such, so the relations of numbers and abstract quantity in algebra, and those between premisses and their conclusion in logic. A syllogism is a demonstration, not indeed of the truth of the conclusion, but of its necessarily following from the premisses. All other proof amounts but to probability, although the maximum of probability will always produce conviction of that on behalf of which it is urged.

Determinism. A name given by Continental philosophers to the creed which views all events and consequently all actions as fixed from the first. As held by a theist, this doctrine becomes the same with that which we call predestinarianism, and it is hard to see how the believer in an absolute and

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perfect God can do otherwise than hold it. Its compatibility with our belief in the free will of man is a subject which cannot be entered on here. Suffice it to say that such compatibility is recognised and maintained; and that the true contradictory of *determinism* is not freedom but contingency, but only such contingency as implies uncertainty in the event of action.

Dialectic. The meaning annexed to this word has at different times waxed and waned in dignity and comprehension. Taking its origin from dialogue, it meant at first inquiry carried on between two people, then naturally the maieutic method of Socrates, and finally with Plato all metaphysics, all philosophy. Under Aristotle the term contracted its import, and denoted probable reasoning as distinguished from demonstrative. "The dialectic syllogism is that from probable premisses."¹ Subsequently dialectic was used for the whole of logic, and this sense of the word kept its ground for ages. It has now, however, fallen into desuetude, and the word when used, generally bears its Aristotelian meaning.

Diallelous. Ο δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος. What is generally called defining or reasoning *in a circle*. The vice creeps in in the former case when we define two things, each by the other. On my challenging an ingenious friend to define time and space, he answered, "Time is the condition of two things existing in the same space. Space is the condition

¹ *Top.* i. 1.

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of two things existing in the same time." This is clever, pointed, and true, but, as may easily be seen, *diallelos*.

Dichotomy. A division into two members. In the same way *trichotomy* is a division into three, and *polytomy* into many. Dichotomy, however, is distinguished from the others by taking a part in practical logic of some little importance. It is always *à priori* possible, it being an axiom that one thing and its negative constitute, and therefore any one term and its negative denote, the universe. This process of *dichotomy by contradiction* has been called the *abscissio infiniti*. This phrase, however, is objectionable, for that which is the subject of abscission cannot be infinite. Plato practised this method, and it forms a leading feature in that of Ramus, by whose followers it was carried to a pedantic extent.

Difference. The mark or marks whereby a species is distinguished from the rest of the genus to which it belongs. See **Predicable**.

Dilemma. Different things are intended by this word. We may distinguish between

1st. The logical dilemma.

2nd. The rhetorical dilemma.

3rd. The sophism commonly called the *crocodilinus* or the *cornutus*, to which the name dilemma has been given.

4th. The conversational use of the word.

1st. The logical *dilemma*. This exactly answers to one probable etymology of the word, double

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$\lambda\eta\mu\mu\alpha$ or sumption. It is not necessary, however, that there should be only two. The kind of reasoning will admit three or more sumptions as readily as two, and it has accordingly been proposed to speak of a *trilemma*, a *tetralemma*, &c. The dilemma, however, will adequately represent the whole procedure. It consists in the combination of two hypotheses, with a complex disjunction. If A is B, or C is D, E is F; but either A is B, or C is D, ∴ E is F. The hypotheses or $\lambda\eta\mu\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, as we have seen, may be more than two, and the kind of reasoning will be the same; the same too should the conclusion be, itself disjunctive, as in the following: If A is B, E is F, and if C is D, G is H. But either A is B, or C is D, ∴ either E is F, or G is H. Further, the disjunction may be not in the antecedents but the consequents, and in this form we can arrive at negative conclusions; e. g. if A is B, either C is D, or E is F, but neither C is D, nor E is F, ∴ A is not B. Negative dilemmas are *destructive*, or in the *modus tollens*; and affirmative ones are called *constructive*, or in the *modus ponens*.

The dilemma is generally classed in logical manuals under the head of syllogism, as one form of that. A very little consideration, however, will show that we have here no distinct form of reasoning, and that, taken by itself, the dilemma is not a syllogism at all. It is combined of two more hypotheses, each of which has to be decided in its own way, and a disjunction of them,

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the adequacy of which must be ascertained. All this done, we have an *immediate*, as distinguished from a *mediate* or syllogistic, inference.

2ndly. The rhetorical dilemma consists in presenting the adversary with a choice of alternatives, each of which involves consequences inconvenient to him or a gain of our point to ourselves. This is called *impaling him on the horns of a dilemma*. It is obviously different from the logical procedure, though it can by manipulation be brought to the form of that. It has been well observed that we have a sacred example of the rhetorical dilemma in our Lord's question to the Pharisees respecting the baptism of John.

3rdly. The name dilemma has been given to the sophism called the *Crocodolinus*, the *Litigiosus*, the *Reciprocus*, and by many names besides. It consists of drawing contradictory consequents from the members of the same disjunction, and thus rendering a conclusion impossible. The best known example of it is the story from which it has procured the name *Litigiosus*. His master received the half of the sum due from his pupil for instructions in pleading, and engaged to wait for the remaining half till the latter should have won his first cause. This the pupil showed no haste to do; whereupon the master, losing patience, sued him for the sum, and the other appeared in court to defend himself in person. "O foolish youth," said the master, before the trial commenced, "dost thou not see that in any event

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thou must lose ? If the decision be in my favour, I have gained my cause, and thou must pay ; if in thine, thou shalt have won thy first cause, and by the terms of our agreement must pay." "O, wisest of masters," rejoined the pupil, "dost thou not see that in any event thou must lose ? If the court decides for me, I need not pay ; if against me, I shall not yet have won a suit, and, by the terms of our agreement, am still free." It is easy to see that the puzzle in this and similar examples results from ambiguity of terms. In the present case we have confounded the compulsory authority of the court and the moral obligation of an agreement. If the latter was to be brought under legal jurisdiction, it could only be by the defeated party bringing a fresh action founded on the issue of the preceding one, the master pleading in this second suit that his pupil had won a case, and was therefore bound to pay him ; or the pupil that he had lost his first suit, and therefore was still free from the master's claim.

4thly. In common conversation by a dilemma is frequently meant a situation in which ill consequences may be apprehended from whatever we do. We thus come to a sense of the word involving results the very opposite of those which follow from the logical dilemma. Here we do not know what to do. There we are brought to a conclusion with warrant more than common. Instead of an inconvenience, there can be nothing more welcome to an inquirer than a dilemma, in

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which he is sure that his disjunction is complete, and that his consequents really follow from the antecedents.

Discourse. Discursus. Mediate or syllogistic, as distinct both from immediate inference, and from intuition. It means a running about, a passing from one thing to another, which of course describes the mental process in syllogising. The term is applied both to the act of reasoning, and to the faculty by which it is performed. Thus in the latter use, we have Shakespeare's

“A beast that wants
Discourse of reason,”

and

“Sure He that made us with such large discourse ;”

and we have the well-known passage of Milton,

“Whence the soul
Reason receives, and Reason is her being
Discursive or intuitive ; discourse
Is oftest your's, the latter most is our's.”

These citations taken from well-known literature show sufficiently the received sense of the word, as it will be found employed in Hooker and our standard philosophical writers. By an easy transition it comes to denote the expression of connected thought, and we call grave conversation *discourse*, and a sermon or essay *a discourse*.

Disjunction. A statement of alternatives, either as to the right subject, or the right predicate, of a proposition. It may be positive or negative. In the former case its connecting particle will be

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or, in the latter *nor*. Logicians are divided as to whether the members of a real disjunction are of necessity exclusive of each other. In company with Whately, Mill, and Mansel, I can see no reason why they should be, either in the laws of thought or the conditions of inference. For the latter it is enough that the disjunction be complete, that it cover the whole ground of possibility.

Distribution. This is a technical phrase in logic for the use of a term in its whole extension. When we say *all men*, *no men*, the term men is said to be *distributed*, i. e. it is applied to everyone who belongs to the class, while when we say *some men* it is *undistributed*, not applied to everyone. In this the original sense of the word singulars are incapable of distribution, and so pronounced by Petrus Hispanus. Nevertheless, in many modern logical works they are said to be distributed (by myself among others) as being of necessity used in their whole extension.

Distribution is likewise a name for the methodical arrangement of a subject, viewing it under what are considered its appropriate heads. When such are species of a genus it becomes identical with *division*.

Division in the scientific sense of the word means the analysis of an extensive i. e. generic, even as definition means that of a comprehensive or specific, whole. We divide a genus into the species which belong to it. Hence the atom or individual is, as the names import, what cannot be thus divided,

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what can only be parted, the parts thus becoming *fractions*.

Dogma, Dogmatic, and Dogmatist. These words are used in a variety of senses, not unconnected, however, with each other. They come from the verb δοκέω, *to think, to seem*—ὡς ἔμοὶ δοκεῖ, *as it seems to me, as I think*; also *as it seems good to me, as I determine*. Hence a dogma like the Latin *placitum* means both a *decree* and a *pronounced opinion*.

It is in the former sense that the word is used in the New Testament.

In the latter sense, it implied in the philosophical language of the ancients, the real or supposed possession of a true knowledge of the law or principle on which phenomena are grounded. Hence when the sceptical school arose, philosophers were divided into *dogmatists* and *empiricists*; the later Academics, who denied the possibility of such knowledge, dogmatising negatively as much as their opponents did positively. The empiricists or Pyrrhonists on the other hand ventured on neither position, but retreated on the *εποχή, restraining*, prescribed by their master.

Phenomena, matters of experience, were the sole objects in their view of legitimate study. Hence their title of *empiricists*.

The distinction seems to have been expanded from medical to all polemic. The school of physicians who grounded their practice entirely on rule and principle were called *methodists*, and their opponents who would trust all to observa-

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tion and experience, *empiricists*, from *ἐμπειρία*. Between the two there arose the intermediate school of *dogmatists*, headed by Galen, who contended for the union of the two modes of inquiry and practice. When, however, we extend our view to philosophy, it is plain that we have but two sides to choose between. Unless we can adopt unqualified scepticism, there must be something of which we think and speak with undoubting certainty. Hence Bacon says that all philosophers before him were either dogmatists or sceptics, and Pascal that every man must be one or the other. Pure Pyrrhonism or scepticism is, however, impossible, since, as I have just said, the doubter must at least be certain that he is, and that he doubts.

A dogma. The following explanation has been given of the words *dogma* and *dogmatical*.

"By dogmatism we understand, in general, both all-propounding and all-receiving of tenets, merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others; in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is offered is *dogmatical*." This I think rather a conversational than an accurate use of the term.

In theology a dogma means the formulated presentation of that which is considered revealed truth. This is quite in harmony with the philosophical sense of the word. The man who should merely read his Bible, and speak of its disclosures

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in no language but its own, would be an *empiricist*, recognising only the phenomena of Revelation. This is a state which no man has ever succeeded in maintaining ; nor, however great the evil of excessive or unwarranted dogma, is it desirable that any man should.

The earliest fathers used the words the *Divine dogmas* to denote the whole of revealed truth. Subsequently the word was employed in the sense which we have just been considering, and meant the scientific theology alike of the Church and of the heretics. In the present Church of Rome it seems to have sometimes a more limited signification, and to denote not every formulated statement, but such as is authoritatively imposed, and its reception made part of necessary faith. “It may be true or not, but is it dogma ?”

Dogma then is the logically formulated and peremptorily enunciated statement of the law and principle of that which apart from it is but so much phenomenon, is seen but not understood. The results of science are thus dogmatic, though the investigations by which we hope to arrive at such ought to be the reverse. The great truths of the faith are set forth dogmatically ; nor could this have been avoided, if the bonds of Christian communion were to be cognisable and fixed, or if Christian worship was to be offered with distinct purpose and meaning. More dogma than is required for these ends is enforced on their teachers by nearly every religious community ;

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but be such additions to their dogmatic stores advantageous or disadvantageous, their enforcement ought to be confined to the teaching class, not extended to the private worshippers. And few but will admit that there may easily be an excess even with this limitation, that there may be an amount of dogma rashly arrived at, the enforcement of which tends to discord and division among the many, and to hardness and stiffening of heart and thought in the individual; over and above the evil which must be involved in all premature dogma, that of obstructing instead of promoting our arrival at truth.

In conversational use, dogmatic, dogmatiser, and dogmatising are terms of reproach, denoting a love and habit of what is called *laying down the law*, a man's regarding his own *ipse dixit* on the subject as sufficient.

Dualism. This title may be given to the recognition of two counter-elements as the constituents of any given effect. It is oftenest used, however, to denote either the leading principle of Persian religion, that the universe is governed by two contrasted beings, Ormuzd and Ahrimanes, the one the god of light and of goodness, the other that of darkness and evil; or else that of much ancient philosophy, which assigned two independent elements to the production of the universe, mind and matter.

The former is considered by some to be referred to and protested against in Isaiah xlvi. 7: "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace,

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and create evil : I the Lord do all these things." Dualism, however, seems so plausible an explanation of the perplexities around us, that it long held its ground, appeared less or more in the leading forms of Gnosticism, and finally became the leading characteristic of Manicheism.

Philosophical dualism is equally opposed to a right faith in God with religions, for it recognises existence independent of Him, without which the universe could not have come into being.

Eclecticism, from ἐκλέγω, *to select*. The term taken generally denotes the principle of not binding oneself to the teaching of any one school, but accepting such doctrines of any as commend themselves to our judgment. He would be an eclectic in philosophy who should take his theory of the origin of ideas from Locke, of the authority of conscience from Butler, and of the standard of right and wrong from Paley. This may serve for an illustration, though the particular eclecticism supposed never has, I should imagine, been exhibited. But short of this it is quite possible to see some good and some truth in different and even opposing schools; nor will a mind at all enlarged refuse to do so. Eclecticism in this sense is only a name for such mental enlargement combined with candour. In the arts, the eclectic will be one who aims at excellence by adopting and combining the merits of various masters and schools. The Bolognese painters, or school of the Caracci, were eclectic.

Eclecticism, however, in the history of philo-

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sophy denotes one particular sect which arose in Alexandria in the second century. Its generally recognised founder was Ammonius Saccas, who opened a school of philosophy, of which Jamblichus, Plotinus, and other men of eminence were disciples. Their principle was that of eclecticism, borrowing from various sects, and availing themselves of the Scriptures. Plato, however, was the chief object of admiration, and they either took or received the name of Neoplatonists. Their doctrines must not, however, be identified with those of their master.

Egoism denotes either the psychological position of those who profess to know only their own existence, or the moral character of those who act only from selfish considerations. This is different from what we mean by *egotism*, the habit of talking about oneself.

Empiricism. See **Dogma** and **Dogmatism**.

Energy. The Aristotelian term for the *Actus, act,* of the schoolmen. See **Act**. Of course this sense of the word is different from the modern one, in which it denotes great force in speech or action.

The word *energy* with its corresponding verbs and participles occurs so frequently in St. Paul's writings, that the question presents itself, did he use it in a precise technical sense? and if so, was that sense the Aristotelian? This is a point which I have never seen discussed. It appears to me, however, that in most if not all the places

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in the Pauline writings where we find the word, it will bear an Aristotelian explanation.

Energy is a term which occupies a marked place in the Monothelite controversy. The Monothelite proposition was that there is one energy in our Lord and Saviour. The Dythelite, which ultimately triumphed, was that as our Lord has in His one Person two natures, each entire and perfect, it is necessary to the integrity of each nature that it should have every *energy* properly appertaining to it, and therefore there must be in the Saviour two wills, the Divine and the human.

The question is one from which the reverent inquirer naturally shrinks. When it was raised, however, it required to be settled. It is easy to see that by both sides the word *energy* was used in its philosophical sense.

Entelechy. The potential has two opposites according to the matter in hand, action or operation, and existence. Aristotle seems to have intended to denote the former by *ἐνέργεια*, and the latter by *ἐντελέχεια*. Energies, he tells us, tend to entelechies.¹ Entelechy may therefore, especially when we consider the formation of the word, be rendered *complete existence*.² The soul is defined by Aristotle “the first entelechy of a body having potential life.”

But Aristotle does not adhere to whatever distinction he may have proposed to make between

¹ *Metaph.* viii. 8, 11.

² Sir A. GRANT, *Arist. Eth.* vol. i. p. 234, 3rd ed.

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energy and *entelechy*. The former he says is not confined to movement, but includes repose. God everlastingly enjoys one pure and simple pleasure. For there is an energy not only of movement, but also of repose.¹ Again, God is *οὐσία ἀΐδιος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. God is eternal substance and energy (act) apart from potentiality.

The meaning assigned to *entelechy* by Sir A. Grant seems the right one. The word, however, has been variously interpreted. Cicero, who may be thought to have confounded it with *ἐνδελέχεια*, explains it as meaning *quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem*.² Melancthon writes it *endelechy*, says it means *continuitas*, and vindicates Cicero's interpretation. It will, however, I suppose be admitted that *ἐνδελέχεια* and *ἐντελέχεια* are quite different words.

Bishop Hermolius Barbarus is said to have consulted the devil in order to find the meaning of the latter. He translated it literally *perfecti-habia*.

Leibnitz calls his monads *entelechies*, as being each a perfected existence. The word is little used.

Enthymeme. This term in our ordinary logical treatises denotes, and for ages has denoted, a syllogism of which one of the premisses is suppressed in utterance, and the *ἐν θυμῷ*, which is the main element in the formation of the word, has been absurdly supposed to give it the meaning of something thought but not uttered. *Cogito ergo*

¹ *Nic. Eth.* ix. 9, 5.

² *Tusc. Quest.* i. quest. 1.

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sum is an enthymeme, though its author Des Cartes did not say it for argumentative ends. The suppressed premiss is *quicquid cogitat est*. *He is contented because he is happy.* Here the conclusion needs for its validity a premiss which is not expressed. *All the contented are happy.*

This is quite different, however, from what Aristotle meant by the enthymeme. In his use of the term it denoted a syllogism from probable propositions or signs. The murderer must have been near at the time. The prisoner was near at the time. Therefore he was the murderer.¹ It is obvious that this is not absolutely conclusive, but a combination of such signs will often be so cogent as to produce rational conviction.

The probable premiss is, as its name imports, no more than probable. The sign may be probable or it may be necessary.²

Entity. Ens. The latter of these words is a participial form derived from *esse*, and signifying something that *exists*. It stands in the same relation to *essentia* that the Greek *ōr* does to *ōvσia*. *Entia, existences*, are divided into *entia rationis*, which can be figured by the mind, but have no external reality, as a man a thousand feet high, and *entia realia*.

Entitas, entity, was used by the schoolmen as the general and abstract term for existence. An *ens* was a *being*, *entitas beinghood*. Everything that is has that which constitutes its being, its entity.

¹ Archbishop Thomson.

² ARISTOTLE, *Anal. Pr.* ii. 27.

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The entity of *animals* lies in their *animality*, of men in their *humanity*. Whether entities in this the true sense of the word have any reality is the question at issue between Nominalists and Realists.

The word *ens* not being vernacular, and there being a strong though pernicious tendency in modern speech to use the abstract and general term to denote the concrete specimen, as in the case of *locality* and many others, *entity* is now employed where the schoolmen would have spoken of *ens*. An *entity* means with us something that exists, a *nonentity* that which does not.

Ens was also used by the schoolmen to denote existence in the abstract, and was thus one of the ante-predicaments or *transcendentals*. See **Transcendental**. It was antecedent to and implied in any category, even that of substance.

Everyone knows Milton's academical exercise composed at the age of nineteen, wherein *Ens* appears as the father of the ten predicaments, and addresses his eldest son *Substance*.

Epichirema. A syllogism with its reason attached to one at least of the premisses. It is no real variation of the syllogism, and deserves no separate consideration in logic, except in so far as it may serve to explain *à fortiori* reasoning.

Esoteric, within. Exoteric, without. These terms are said to have been employed by the Pythagorians to the disciples of the school, according as they were, or were not, perfectly initiated.

[*ESOTERIC*.]

Aristotle distinguishes between his *exoteric* and his *acromatic* writings. Dean Blakesley argues that the latter were not distinguished from the former by containing anything more secret or mysterious. The difference between the two he contends was that between an occasional discussion and a systematic discourse.

The terms *esoteric* and *exoteric* are now, I think, always applied to doctrines and teaching, the elementary instruction suited to the beginner, the milk that is suited to babes, being *exoteric*, and the deeper wisdom the strong meat that is due to the advanced disciple being *esoteric* doctrine.

Essence. This word, like its kindred *ens*, is traced by Quintilian to a certain Flavius or Fabianus, but by Seneca to Cicero. As *ens* means taken generally existence, and taken particularly an existing individual, so *essence* means that which constitutes the existence of anything, makes it that which it is. It is formed from a real or conjured up participle present of the verb to be, *essens*, to which it stands in exactly the same relation as does the Greek ὅντα to ὁν. Accordingly it seems at first to have been employed by the Latins as the translation of that, for which end, however, it became gradually supplanted by *substantia*. The result was that the schoolmen distinguished between substance and essence, and denoted by the latter, the true definition of a thing, to the exclusion of all that is accidental.

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In this sense the reality of the thing is not necessarily implied. An *ens rationis* has its essence quite as much as that which actually exists.

Of God alone can it be said that existence is an element of His essence.

The use of the word essence for the product of distillation is obviously connected with the true and general meaning of the word.

The adjective essential is used continually as synonymous with needful. Here, however, we do not depart from the true force of the word. It is *essential* that we do this, means that doing this is of the essence of that which we desire or propose.

Eternity. See **A parte ante** and **A parte post**.

Eternity has been said to be "a negative idea expressed by a positive sense. It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end of that existence."¹ I cannot admit this. No doubt the word denotes negation of beginning or end, but this is but part of its meaning. Every term is negative of something, for every term excludes something. In this point of view eternity denotes the negation not only of a beginning or an end, but of a succession in time altogether. But it is a serious error to regard it as merely or mainly a negation. That which is beyond the possibility of measurement may nevertheless make a very positive impression upon us, all the more positive according to Barrow and Cudworth on

¹ FLEMING, *Vocabulary of Phil.*, in voc.

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that very account. And the mystery which man forbodes when

“He names the name Eternity”

is surely no negation except of the Nature in which he can nowhere find

“That type of Perfect in his mind.”

The stedfast and enduring presence of all things to Him Who inhabiteth eternity has been called, as we have seen, the *nunc stans* of eternity, and it is of this that many commentators understand the “this day have I begotten Thee” of the second Psalm.

The thought of eternity is necessarily involved in that of God's absolute Being and perfection, and the French Protestant version of the Scriptures translates not unfelicitously the *I Am Who Am*¹ that was uttered from the burning bush, by *Je suis l'Eternal*.

Ethics. Morals. The science or theory of morals. The word is formed from $\eta\theta\sigma\zeta$ signifying both a manner or custom, and a temper, disposition, or character. The latter are much connected with the former, of which indeed they are the results, and this close association is pointed out by Aristotle as indicated in the resemblance of the words $\varepsilon\theta\sigma\zeta$ and $\eta\theta\sigma\zeta$.² Plato too speaks of $\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\iota \varepsilon\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$.³

Extension. Stretching out. The quality of matter, in virtue of which every portion or particle of it

¹ Not *I am that I am*, as in our present version.

² *Eth. Nic.* ii. 1.

³ *Leg. xii.*

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must occupy a certain portion of space. The Cartesian school considers it the essence of matter, which they distinguished from mind by calling the one *res extensa* and the other *res cogitans*. Whatever is extended is of necessity divisible, but when we think of the ultimate atom, we exclude both the one and the other of these attributes. Whether such ultimate atoms exist is a question, but there can be none that if they do they are as their name imports, indivisible, and as such without extension.

In logic the *extension* of a term means the number of objects, as its comprehension the number of qualities, which it includes. See **Comprehension**.

Fallacy. This word is sometimes used as if it were merely synonymous with error. It properly means, however, something which causes error, and technically denotes an inaccuracy in reasoning which vitiates the process and invalidates the conclusion. Though not to be distinguished in itself from a sophism, I think that in these latter days we generally denote by fallacy a defect in the reasoning which is unobserved by the reasoner himself, and deceives him as much as anyone else, and by sophism a trick played of set purpose to bewilder another.

The generic name for fallacies and sophisms of every sort is *paralogism*, a transgression of logical

n φαντασία. Plato and Aristotle gave

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this title to the mind's presentative or representative power, and as that conjures up images both of the present and absent, of the real and the unreal, the faculty would seem identical with imagination. In our older writers the latter seems always denoted by the word *fancy*. Thus Milton :

“In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief ; among them Fancy next
Her office holds ; of all external things
Which the five watchful senses represent,
She forms imaginations, airy shapes.”

Down to the time of Addison, and later still, as by Johnson and Akenside, the fancy and the imagination were identified. There being, however, two faculties, which, though allied to each other, are in themselves distinct, it is right to assign to them separate titles; and without regard to its etymology the word fancy has been recently used to denote the mere aggregative and associative power as distinguished from the higher gift of imagination. See **Imagination**. The sense or senses in which the adjective *fanciful* has been constantly employed, would seem to have anticipated this distinction, for no one I suppose when led to the use of this word, would ever have thought *imaginative* a synonym for it.

As fancy is an abbreviated form of phantasy, Dr. Johnson observes that it should be spelt *phancy*. The Italian and Spanish rule of substituting the letter F for *ph*, the Latin equivalent

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to the Greek φ, seems to have crept into our language in this one case, and doubtless would have extended farther, if words originally Greek, passing to us through the Latin, had not been with us for the most part terms of art, and used only in learned discourse.

Form. The distinction between matter *ὕλη* and form *μορφή* or *εἶδος*, and their concurrence in the *σύνολον*, as constituting real existence are an important element in the Aristotelian philosophy. Mere matter cannot constitute anything, till it receives some sort of form, which gives it determinate and distinct existence, makes it what it is. Matter antecedent to the reception of any form was called by philosophers *elementary* or *materia prima*. Of course such matter can be neither seen, felt, or in any way conceived. Every object of perception is *ipso facto* recognised as something, and has therefore some form. Only Ralpho in *Hudibras*,

“ — professed
He had first matter seen undressed ;
He took her naked all alone,
Before one rag of form was on.”

When the word matter is used in this sense, it is in antithesis to *form* not to *mind*; and it may easily be seen that it need not mean anything corporeal. Virtues, vices, heresies, and the like, have in the language of the schools their matter and their form. A man is in material heresy who makes a statement in verbal opposition to the orthodox faith, but he is not formally a heretic unless he means and prefers the position thus

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opposed to the truth. An act may have the matter of schism, but is not formal schism in him who commits it without knowing the circumstances of the case, or the questions with which it is connected.

The form then of anything is that which constitutes it what it is. This matter, whether mental or corporeal, constitutes nothing till it has received form. The formal cause then (see **Cause**) is that which determines anything in its distinct being.

Now, in ordinary modern language *form* is used rather in contradistinction to that which is real; a use almost the opposite of the philosophical, in which latter the *form* is nearly equivalent to the essence. The employment of the term by Bacon, as identical in meaning with the *vera differentia* and the *natura naturans*, is in accordance with this.

The true force of the word comes out clearly in the following :

“Anzi è *formale* ad esto besto esse
Tenersi dentro alla divina voglia ;
Perch’ una fansi nostre voglie stesse.”

DANTE, *Paradiso*, iii.

Carey renders the tercet thus :

“ Rather it is *inherent* in this state
Of blessedness, to keep ourselves within
The Divine Will, by which our wills with His are one.”

Sir Frederick Pollock as follows :

“ In this blest state it is *essential* hence
To the Divine Will to conform the thoughts,
That our wills together may make one.”

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And Mrs. Ramsay :

“ For 'tis *essential* to this life of bliss
To hold ourselves within the Will Divine,
That thus our wills should be at one with His.”

Of these the two latter keep nearer to the force of *formale* than the first. Still *essential* is infelicitous, for it means *of or belonging to the essence*, and not therefore necessarily constituting it. It would have been better both in respect of philosophical exactness and retention of the scholastic costume of the *Divina Commedia* to have rendered *formale* literally by *formal*, the rather that all three translators do so in the conclusion of the immediately preceding canto. A note would have explained to the ordinary reader the force of the term.

I have hitherto been dealing merely with the Aristotelian and subsequent scholastic force of the word *form*. In ancient times it ran through various shades of meaning pretty correspondent to those which it bears among ourselves. Plato in the *Republic* uses it as we should in contradistinction to the reality, the true *ἰδέα*. And it seems often to have been taken as nearly synonymous with *σχῆμα*, outward shape or fashion. But in grave discourse since Aristotle we may expect to find a distinction, and *μορφή* or form appropriated to the real being of that to which the term is applied.

Trench, in his *New Testament Synonyms*, 2nd series, has a valuable article on the three words,

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μορφή, σχῆμα, and ἰδέα, together with the cognates of the two former, μετασχηματίζειν and μεταμορφοῦν, and Professor Lightfoot furnishes a most profound note on the word μορφή in connection with the sublimest application that was ever made of it, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians*.¹

Whatever variations may be found in the use of the word, the strict scholastic meaning should be kept carefully in mind by the student of our old writers, although with them too, it will be found used sometimes exactly, sometimes loosely.

For the phrase “under the forms of bread and wine,” see **Species**.

General, Generalization, Genus. Of these the last denotes simply *kind*, not as distinguished by class marks from the objects of a kind larger than itself, in which case it would be *species*.

Generalization means both the faculty and the act of referring a perceived object to a genus. To this, as we have seen, an act of abstraction is requisite, seeing that all which is not common to the object with the rest of the genus must be removed from our thoughts of it, before we view it simply according to its kind. See **Abstraction**.

General means of or belonging to the genus. That is generally true which is true of the whole genus. This consideration is worth pausing on,

¹ It is worth remarking that St. Paul denotes a mere outward appearance, without inward reality, not by the word μορφή, but by μόρφωσις.—Rom. ii. 20, 2 Tim. iii. 5.

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seeing that *generally* and *in general* in ordinary talk denote *the most*, the ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, the *in plurimum*, to the exclusion of *all*. Whereas, in their true sense they are universal, and have only acquired the force of *most* from our frequent implicit recognition of the fact that whereas an attribute may be predicated of a whole genus, there are yet some specimens of such genus which stand out or may stand out as exceptions. What we say of *the generality* we say universally, the exceptions being allowed for, and our predication is understood to have the genus for its subject after such allowance has been made.

It may be a question whether such allowance was before the mind of Overall when, drawing up the last section of the Catechism, he pronounced Baptism and the Supper of the Lord to be "*generally* necessary to salvation." He may have meant a contingent generality, one ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, which is the way in which he has been ordinarily understood, or, not contemplating exceptional cases, he may have predicated an universal necessity, one for men *in general* of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as distinguished from the special necessity of other means of grace in especial circumstances.

Habit. From *habeo*, to have, as the Greek equivalent ἔχει from ἔχω. Habit means a permanent though in many matters acquired state, and is opposed to *διάθεσις*, disposition. The latter is temporary and can be removed with comparative

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ease, the former permanent and removable with difficulty. Thus the state of accidental intoxication constitutes but a *diathesis*, continual drunkenness a habit.

Aristotle defines habit as the act intermediate between possessing and being possessed, just as when one makes and something is thereby made there is between the two a *making*. Also in the same passage he calls it a *diathesis*, though elsewhere he makes the distinction between these which I have just laid down. Further, he says that it is part of a given *diathesis*.¹

Habit, then, may be defined with Sir W. Hamilton, "the relation of the thing having, and the thing had."² It is one of the ten Categories or Predicaments, though, as is freely confessed in the treatise on these with which the *Organon* is opened, it really falls under that of *quality*.

In physical and medical science, the word is used in its original largeness of meaning, i. e. not as confined to action, but as embracing states, modes of being, and we are accordingly familiar with the phrases "habit of body," "a full" or "a spare habit." Also, medical men speak of a *cachexy*, a permanent bad condition of the body.

In another way we both adhere to the etymology, and recognise the original bearings of the word, when we speak of clothes as *habits*.

Aristotle, seeking for a definition of virtue,³ says that there are in the soul three things,

¹ *Met.* iv. 20.

² HAMILTON'S *Reid*, 688.

³ *Eth. Nic.* ii. 5.

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passions, powers, habits, and the question is to which of the three does virtue belong. After examination he refers it to the last. In further consideration of the subject he arrives at a puzzle from which without the aid of revelation I do not see an escape. Habits, he justly observes, are produced by repeatedly doing the actions which are appropriate to them. "Εθος gives birth to ηθος. This is a truth with which we are all familiar, so familiar that, as Sir W. Hamilton has observed, we call the cause by the name of the effect, and speak of a custom as a habit, instead of as that which produces a habit. But to return to the Aristotelian puzzle. Virtue being a habit, the specific character of which is laid down by Aristotle,¹ it would seem that it is to be acquired by doing virtuous actions. But how is an action to be virtuous if it wants the very essence of virtue, the being habitual?² We must then be virtuous in order that our deeds be virtuous, righteous in order that they may be righteous. Only in the Christian dispensation is this riddle solved. Only in the truth that Christ is made unto us righteousness, can we see our way out of the great difficulty. His righteousness is by the act of grace made *the habit* of the believer's soul.

Habits are divided into active and passive. "The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of our bodily organs give birth

¹ *Eth. Nic.* ii. 6.² *Eth. Nic.* ii. 4.

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to active habits ; the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive habits.”¹

Aristotle shows that our habits are voluntary, because they are produced by voluntary actions. Over and above this, however unmarked may be its action in that which has become habitual, there may be, I think, an abiding habit of the will.

Is the law of custom producing habit confined to living agents ? According to Aristotle it is so. No practice, he argues, will make a stone fly upwards, or flame burn downwards. To this Lord Bacon objects, and says with his usual felicity of phrase, “ Though this principle be true in things wherein Nature is peremptory, the reason whereof we cannot stand now to discuss, yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth a latitude. For he (Aristotle) might see that a strait glove will come on more easily with use ; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew.”²

The great authorities on habit as connected with ethics are, among the ancients Aristotle, and Butler among the moderns.

Hypothesis. From *ὑπό* and *θέσις*, *a placing under*. The Latin *suppositio* exactly corresponds in formation and meaning, and hypothesis may very well be explained by *supposition*.

Aristotle³ supplies us with the following ac-

¹ FLEMING, *Voc.*

² *Advancement of Learning*, book ii. *De Augmentis*, book vii.

³ *Analyt. Post.* L. i. c. 2.

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count of the preliminaries of reasoning. If we have a point of departure, as we needs must, which does not admit of proof itself, because it is the basis of proof, and is not an axiom, it is to be called a *θέσις*, position. A thesis or position may either state *what* the thing is, in which case it is a *definition*; or it may state *that* it is, or that it is not, and then it is an hypothesis.

The enunciations prefixed to the theoretical propositions of Euclid, together with his definitions, are the theses which render his demonstrations possible. That the radii of a circle are equal is the result of his definition of a circle, and is a thesis of which he makes continual use; that in a given proposition in the enunciation of which he has laid it down that the angle A B C is equal to the angle A B D, we are presented with an hypothesis, a *supposition*, on which he reasons. In the demonstration the angles are equal *by hypothesis*.

The word, however, without essential change of meaning, is used for the most part nowadays in a more especial sense. We mean by an hypothesis a supposition not proved, and perhaps not provable by itself, adopted in order to explain a set of phenomena. The history of physical science is the record of a succession of such. The Ptolemaic system was an hypothesis, so that of Tycho Brahe, so the Copernican.

We must not identify such hypotheses, as does Reid, with mere conjecture. Doing this, he treats hypothesis of every sort with unmitigated

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scorn, and pronounces that we should “despair of ever advancing real knowledge in that way.”¹ This, however, is to fly in the face of all history. The right employment of hypotheses has continually furnished the steps by which real knowledge has been gained and a true theory arrived at.

How has hypothesis done this, and what is such right employment? The answer to the first question is that an hypothesis furnishes us with a reason for trying one set of experiments sooner than any other, and with some principle of selection in experiments we must be furnished if we are to make a beginning at all. We use our hypothesis aright when we use it for this reason, keeping steadily in mind its provisional nature, and holding ourselves in readiness to abandon it the moment the result of our experiments is adverse to it. It ought too to be credible in itself, not at variance with any knowledge that we possess, or any ascertained facts, whether in the sphere with which we are at present engaged, or in any other.

Hypothesis thus used is plainly a path of progress. Even should it ultimately prove untenable, it will have led to many experiments and much ascertainment of fact. If, on the other hand, it be found to explain all the phenomena, not only those which first stirred inquiry, but the additional ones which such inquiry has brought to

¹ REID on the *Intellectual Poems*, Essay I. cap. iii.

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view, if it do this with as much clearness in what might at first seem adverse as in favourable cases, and if nothing else can explain them, then the hypothesis may be regarded as established, and as providing us with the true theory of the facts to which it has been applied. The animal spirits and the vortices of Des Cartes have disappeared from the world of science, as has the astronomical system of Ptolemy, while that of Copernicus, at first as much an hypothesis as they, has taken rank with established truth. But surely the Ptolemaic system led to much important astronomical observation which would hardly have been made without its guidance.

As hypothesis ought not to be identified with mere *conjecture*, so ought it not to be with *theory*, which is a word of larger meaning (see **Theory**).

Idea, Ideal, Idealization. Few words have had a more singular history, or passed through greater changes of meaning than the word *idea*. Derived from *ἰδεῖν*, to see, it originally meant *form*, *appearance*, and sometimes *semblance* in contradistinction to reality. We have to do, however, at present only with its varied meanings in philosophy. There it is nearly equivalent to *εἶδος*, *form*, *species*, that which, as we have seen, when added to matter gives to the subject of such addition determinate character and reality. But in Plato, though this is comprehended in them, the *ἰδέαι* are something more and greater. They are antecedent to and independent of the things in which they are exhibited, and to which they give determina-

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tion. They are uncreated and eternal, the archetypes and exemplars by which God made the phenomenal existences of the world. Those phenomenal existences have reality by participation $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\xi\varsigma$ in their appropriate idea. But no farther, the idea is the truth, the only real object of knowledge and science. It is but exhibited partially in the highest phenomenon, never without the accompaniment of something accidental and alien.

All this is not only important in itself, but in reference to our present purpose, for the Platonic meaning of idea was long the established one. Aristotle, dissenting from his master's doctrine, did not change the meaning of the word, which it retained in philosophy, and, speaking generally, in letters, till the time of Des Cartes. Thus Spenser :

“ Fair is the heaven where happy soules have place,
In full enjoyment of felicitie,
Whence they doe still behold the glorious Face
Of the Divine Eternall Majestie ;
More fair is that, where those *Idees* on hie
Enraunged be, which Plato so admyred,
And pure Intelligences from God inspyred.”

And thus Milton speaks of God surveying his finished world :

“ From his work
Desisting, though unwearied, up returned,
Up to the Heaven of Heavens, His high abode,
Thence to behold this new created world,
The addition of His empire, how it showed
In prospect from His throne, how good, how fair,
Answering His great *Idea*.”

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Nor is it merely the Platonic sense of the word that must be kept in mind. The Platonic doctrine must be remembered by those who would understand some of the finest poetry. For example, that doctrine is brought out in several of Michael Angelo's Sonnets, and in Spenser's Hymns already quoted, and to come down to a poet of lower rank, but still a genuine one, it is set forth in Akenside's *Pleasures of Imagination*.

Coleridge of course was faithful to this highest sense of *idea*, and protested against the modern applications of the word. The two following quotations will show what it reached to in his mouth. "Oh, what a mine of undiscovered treasures, what a new world of power and truth, would the Bible promise to our future meditation, if in some gracious moment, one solitary text of all its inspired contents should but dawn upon us in the pure untroubled brightness of an *idea*, that most glorious birth of the God-like within us, which even as the light, its material symbol, reflects itself from a thousand surfaces, and flies homeward to its parent mind enriched with a thousand forms, itself above form and still remaining in its own simplicity and identity!"¹

The reader will not object to the next, if he considers that in this philosophy, ideas are not merely realities, but the only realities. Coleridge is arguing the impossibility of approaching God in virtue of our own righteousness or otherwise

¹ *Statesman's Manual*, pp. 63, 64.

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than through Christ, and winds up thus, “Oh ! take counsel of thy reason. It will show thee how impossible it is that even a world should merit the love of eternal wisdom and all-sufficing beatitude, otherwise than as it is contained in that all-perfect *idea*, in which the Supreme Spirit contemplates Himself and the plenitude of His infinity—the Only Begotten before all ages, the beloved Son, in Whom the Father is indeed well pleased.”¹

The word *idea*, however, was not always used by our older writers, any more than by the Greeks, in its exact philosophical sense. Thus we find in Shakespeare :

“ Being the right idea of your father
Both in your form and nobleness of mind.”

King Rich. III. act iii. scene 7.

Here, though the use is not remote from the philosophical one, and though the passage might perhaps be expounded in accordance with that, it is probable that no more is intended than *semblance, aspect*.

Still the Platonic sense was generally attached to the word till Des Cartes introduced the first great change of its meaning, and employed it to denote our mental representations of external objects whereby perception is constituted or else which is its immediate result.

Locke perhaps made a still further deflection from the Platonic sense. He says that “it”

¹ *Aids to Reflection*, 3rd ed., pp. 253, 254.

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(idea) "is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." In this use an idea means the same thing as *a thought* of any sort; it is thus that the word has since been very generally employed and understood.

This extension, however, of meaning, has not passed without censure. Reid speaks of taking idea as synonymous with thought or notion, as the vulgar use of the word, and the Cartesian sense of it or what he considered such as the philosophical one, i. e. as that in which the term is understood by philosophers, though he denies the existence of what is so understood, of ideas as interposed in perception between the mind and external objects.

Boswell has recorded of Johnson that "he was particularly indignant with the almost universal use of the word *idea* in the sense of notion, or opinion, when it is clear that *idea* can only signify something of which an image can be formed in the mind. . . . Yet we hear the sages of the law *delivering their ideas upon the question under consideration*. . . . Johnson called this *modern cant*."¹ It is not apparent, however, from this that Johnson reverted to the Platonic sense of the term; indeed I do scarcely remember a single

¹ BOSWELL'S *Life of Johnson*, vol. iii. p. 225, ed. 820.

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word of his, which would furnish an inference that he had ever heard either of Plato or Aristotle. In common conversation the word has now run often into a swamp of meanings, so as to denote thought, opinion, liking, or desire. Such an one tells us that he has no *idea* of spending September in London, while another exclaims, "The *idea* of his pretending to be better than other people!"

"An idea is equidistant in its signification from sensation, image, fact, and notion. The magnificent son (grandson) of Cosmo was wont to discourse with Ticino, Politica, and the princely Mirandula on the ideas of Will, God, and Immortality. The accomplished author of the *Arcadia*, the star of serenest brilliance in the glorious constellation of Elizabeth's court, our England's Sir Philip Sidney! He, the paramount gentleman of Europe, the poet, warrior, and statesman, held high converse with Spenser on the *idea* of supersensual beauty. . . . But these lights shine no longer, or for a few. Exeunt and enter in their stead Holofernes and Costard! masked as Metaphysics and Common Sense. And these have *their* ideas. The former has an *idea* that Hume, Hartley, and Condillac have explored all ideas but those of sensation; he has an *idea* that he was particularly pleased with the fine *idea* of the last-named philosopher, that there is no absurdity in asking, *what colour virtue is of?* . . . The latter has no *idea* of a better flavoured haunch of venison than he dined off at the 'Albion'; he admits

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that the French have an excellent *idea* of cooking in general, but holds that their best cooks have no more *idea* of dressing a turtle than the gourmands themselves, at Paris, have of the true taste and colour of the fat!"¹ Such vulgarisms can and should be avoided, but since in philosophical language the word *idea* has passed through the varying meanings that have come before us, it would be pedantic and difficult if not impossible to confine ourselves to the Platonic one. We must let our context tell in what sense we are employing the term. Modern usage has indeed found another resource, and the adjective *ideal* used substantively seems very often to stand in the place of *idea* in its old acceptation. We speak of *the ideal* as distinguished from the phenomenal of any thing or things, falling short as the latter always does of the perfection of the former, and encumbered with what is accidental and alien to that.

Idealization means the act first of viewing, then of exhibiting things in their *idea* or *ideal*. The doing so falls under the province of the *imagination*, and its successful manifestation is the great aim of the fine arts, each in its distinctive sphere. Where this is not attained, or not even pursued, I should deny the title of *fine art* to the work produced. Mere exhibition of things as they are, with all their accidents, is now indeed called

¹ COLERIDGE, *Statesman's Manual*, Appendix, pp. 36, 37.

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realistic in contradistinction to idealistic, art. This I fancy is a very modern use of the former term, which has two very distinct applications in philosophy, with neither of which the one in question has anything to do. See **Idealism, Nominalism, Realism.**

Nor can such work plead greater reality or truth than that of art when, faithful to its high vocation, it aims at exhibiting the ideal. For the idea is the truth, the phenomenon veils that truth under the accidental and the alien. "It is more like than the man himself," was the compliment paid by an Irishman to the portrait before him. This is generally regarded as a ridiculous bull, but it is really the expression of a great truth. The mere facts of a man's appearance at any given moment do not constitute the highest law which governs his aspect, do not give the truest expression of his countenance and gesture. Hence as portraits photographs are seldom satisfactory. There is no substitute for the artist's mind, who looking not at the fact of a moment but at the habitual play and law of a human countenance,

"Divinely thro' all hindrance finds the man
Behind it ;"

and thus such an artist may produce a portrait that may well be pronounced more like than the original at that instant standing before it.

Idealism is the name given to the creed of Berkeley

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and those who with him deny the reality of matter, also to those who denied the immediacy of the object in the act of perception, holding that there intervenes between the one and the other, a mental representation or idea. In this regard that of their opponents, the majority of mankind, is called *realism*, a different use of the term from the mediæval, in which it is opposed to *nominalism*.

Identity, Law of. This is a name given to the axiom that everything is what it is. $A = A$. It has for its correlative the *Law of Contradiction*, that the same proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true. Both positions may seem to the beginner mere truisms, and the assertion of them to be no better than trifling. The results of logic, however, follow from them; in fact they lie at the foundation of all reasoning whatsoever.

Identity, Personal. Our being each of us one and the same person in spite of the various changes that pass on us through life. The validity of arguments in defence of this may be disputed, but no man can shake off the conviction that it is so. Our personal identity has its root in the *ego*. Far back as the time may be, and changed as I may be in aspect, from capacities and habitual feelings, I know that it was I who said the word or did the deed which I remember.

The most valuable English treatise on Personal Identity is one by Bishop Butler, appended to the *Analogy*.

Imagination. The faculty of producing images of that which is not present. There is no man not an idiot who is quite devoid of this, and none who does not frequently exercise the power. But we seldom speak of imagination as characteristic of any man, except where it exists and acts in an unusual degree, and where it gives power more than ordinary to present to other minds the images which it creates.

We connect both the exercise and the aim of this faculty mainly with poetry, with the fine arts in general, and with works of fiction. But its uses are not limited to these. A defect of imagination is a calamity not merely as depriving a man of the pleasure to be derived and rendering him unsusceptible of the valuable influences to be gained from them, not as producing an unsympathetic character, but because it impedes much mental effort with which people do not ordinarily associate the faculty. A little consideration will show that imagination is needful for the historian as well as the poet. He too has occasion to throw himself into that which is not present, and to enable his readers to do the same. Even in science I suspect that imagination is required in order to catch and detain the anticipations whereby great results have dawned on the mind of the votary. To turn to morals, selfishness will be found to deaden the imagination even in those who possess naturally a large share of the faculty, and who still exercise it abundantly in matters of mere taste. But they cannot throw themselves

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into the situation, or enter into the feelings, of others.

In the sphere with which we habitually connect the word, that of poetry and æsthetics, a distinction has of late been recognised and insisted on between imagination and fancy. (See **Fancy**.) By our older writers, as I observed under that head, the words were for the most part used synonymously. So in the celebrated passage in the "Midsummer Night's Dream" Theseus employs the one word¹ and Hippolita the other, obviously meaning the same thing.

Milton as we have already seen means imagination by fancy (see **Fancy**), and in addition to the passage already quoted I may refer to his

"Sweetest Shakespear, Fancy's child."

Still, the distinction between them has been much insisted on of late. Etymologically considered, the word fancy is no doubt as well adapted to denote the higher as the lower faculty, but as imagination could not be employed to designate the latter, it has now claimed the office of denoting the other, and excluded fancy from that honour.

Leaving, however, the question of names, it is

¹ How curiously this passage has been misunderstood! I have seen it quoted thus, "the imagination all compact," *compact* being obviously supposed to agree with imagination, and to describe a particular kind or mode of the faculty characteristic of "the lunatic, the lover, and the poet," whereas it is plainly they who

"Are of imagination all compact,"
i. e. compacted.

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beyond dispute that there are *two* faculties between which there exists a great distinction. One is the power of associating and combining things which are quite dissociated in ordinary minds, and thus shedding clear and lively illustration on the matters with which it deals. The other instead of combining unites, gathers into a whole, gives that whole form and aspect, and is well spoken of by Coleridge as

“The *shaping* spirit of Imagination.”

It is obvious that this creative power is something distinct from the mere ingenuity of combining with which it has been often confounded, and being so is entitled to have a different name.

These two faculties, however, though distinct, are not unallied, and the exercise of the higher does not preclude the use of the lower as a subordinate instrument. In this respect the case corresponds with that of the reason and the understanding. The most imaginative poet may have to use a lively fancy, as the most genial humorist may possess a ready wit. Usually, however, a marked development of the imagination will throw into the background the exercise of fancy, which will not show itself prominently either in the great poet, or the great humorist, though there may be happy analogies in the works of the one which are tinged with a beauty making them poetical, and sparkling point in the felicities of the other, which have enough of the ludicrous to bring them within the sphere of humour.

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Similes and metaphors are natural exercises both of fancy and imagination. But the similes and metaphors produced by the one will be mainly analogies, those produced by the other will be imagery. Thus Waller's

“The soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed,
Lets in new lights through chinks that time has made,”

gives us a very happy analogy between the light that is admitted by a decaying wall and the increased illumination of a mind over which the body through growing decrepitude is losing its ascendancy. But it cannot rank much higher than as an exercise of the fancy. It presents no picture, creates no image. So, too, Campbell's well-known

“Tis the sunset of life gives me mystical lore,
And coming events cast their shadows before,”

is perhaps more fanciful than imaginative, though there is a touch of the latter quality in the second line, and though there is a beauty both of thought and expression which certainly brings the whole within the sphere of poetry. On the other hand,

“The dews of the evening most carefully shun
Those tears of the sky for the loss of the sun,”

is merely fanciful, and not in the least poetical. It is a conceit, and fancy by itself dwells in the region of conceits. I have said that it is not poetical, and the word *poetical* when etymologically viewed illustrates the whole question. But compare these with the similes of the Pro-

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phets, of Homer, of Dante, and we at once feel that we are dealing with different matter, with the exercises of different faculties, and the production of different results. Still more does the impotence of the fancy appear when leaving metaphors and similes we come to the grand creations of imaginative power, the vivid presentation of scenes, delineation of actions, and exhibitions of character.

To sum up. Wit is the exercise of fancy, humour of imagination. Sculpture and painting must be imaginative to be good for anything. Poetry too must be imaginative, but in the universality both of its range and its materials may give subordinate employment to the fancy as well.

The distinction between fancy and imagination is handled by Wordsworth¹ and by Coleridge.²

Immanent. An act is called *immanent* which does not pass out of the agent, *transitive* if it has an effect or product external to himself. The generation of the Son is an *immanent*, the creation of the world a *transitive*, act of Deity.

Indefinite. That of which we know no bounds is called indefinite, for which we should not substitute the word infinite, which denotes that which has and can have none.

Indefinite is sometimes used in logic to denote terms which have no sign of logical quantity universal or particular attached to them, as

¹ *Preface.* ² *Biographia Literaria*, pp. 65 et seq., ed. 1847.

INDEFINITE.]

Londoners, *Frenchmen*, and the like, as distinguished from such as have, *all Londoners*, *some Londoners*, &c. Since Sir W. Hamilton's writings, however, this use of the word is likely to die off. With far more felicity he applies it to the *particular* term *some*, of which the precise extent is not given, and substitutes for it in the other case the title *indesignate*.

Indesignate may therefore be now considered the title of terms used without marks indicating their logical quantity. Different opinions exist respecting the logical quantity thus unindicated; some thinking that it may be either universal or particular, a matter to be determined by the context; others (among whom I include myself), that the *indesignate* is always or generally a singular, and as such universal.¹

Individual. The atom or unit as or distinguished from the special or general. Indeed *individual* is the exact Latin equivalent to the Greek *ἄτομος* that which *cannot be cut*, but has never been used so far as I am aware to denote the material atom. It means that which cannot be logically divided, but if maimed or deprived of its integrity can only be so by *fraction*. *John is well* or *John is ill* must mean the individual John, not part of him; but John may have his leg cut off, the individual remaining still John.

The vulgar use of this word, as synonymous with *person*, *human being*, is always to be avoided.

¹ *Port Royal Logic*, c. iii.; GARDEN'S *Logic*, 2nd ed. part i. § 8, and note pp. 158, 159.

INDIVIDUAL.]

In the seventeenth century *individual* sometimes bore the sense of *not to be put asunder, indissoluble*. Thus Milton :

“Then long eternity shall greet our bliss
With an *individual* kiss.”

Lines on a Clock.

Induction. (Gr. ἐπαγωγή.) The counter process to deduction. That is, a reasoning from the greater to the less, from the whole to the part, from the universal to the particular. Induction on the other hand leads from the particular up to the universal. So far all is clear, but the word is used in different though related senses. It sometimes denotes the form of reasoning by which we thus ascend from particulars to universals, which is expounded by Aristotle,¹ sometimes the collection of examples, and the experiments by whose result we conceive ourselves warranted in doing this, and sometimes the result itself as a process of thought whereby we pass from the limited instances to an indefinite, or as men call it infinite, law, the process termed by P. Gratry *transcendence*. In the sciences entitled Inductive the word is generally taken in a still greater breadth of meaning, and as the late Professor De Morgan truly observed of such induction, “its instruments are induction properly so called, separation of apparently related, but really distinct, particulars,—mathematical deduction, ordinary logic, &c. It is the use of the whole box of tools.”²

¹ *Analyt.* Pr. ii. 23.

² DE MORGAN, *Formal Logic*, pp. 215, 216.

Infinite. That which neither has, nor can have bounds is styled infinite. The word has been incautiously used in controversy upon the highest subjects which can occupy the mind of man, and been made the means of reducing our thoughts of them into hopeless riddles and perplexities. We often speak of God as infinite, but when we do so we ought to remember that the adjective has no meaning when applied to being simply as such, that it can only apply to attributes, and that when we do thus apply it to His, we can mean by it only that they and their exercise have no limits except such as He Himself sees fit to assign; but that with Him all must be the perfection of measurement and harmony. Some recent speculations, in my mind, of a most hurtful tendency, might have been avoided by this consideration.

A distinction, too, should always be kept in mind between potential and actual infinity. The attributes of God possess the former, but we do not know that their exercise comes under the latter. We have already seen that such exercise must be the perfection of measurement. Arithmetical and mathematical infinity are merely potential.

Instance. Ever since Bacon and perhaps his contemporaries¹ this word has borne the sense of *example*. Any case of a rule or principle is called an *instance* of it. *For instance* is a form of speech altogether equivalent to *for example*. By the

¹ *Vide SHAKESPEARE's Wise Saws and Modern Instances.*

INSTANCE.]

schoolmen, however, *instantia* was used for the Greek ἐντάσις, of which it is the exact translation. This means an *objection*, the bringing forward a *case to the contrary* of what has been laid down. So that the phrase *an instance to the contrary* would have been in their lips redundant.¹

Intuition. From the Latin *intueor*, *I behold*. The term is applied in philosophy to ideas and convictions at which the mind arrives by no discursive process, nor even by the inferences to which every proposition of itself gives birth, such as conversion, but immediately and necessarily; truths which the mind sees and needs not prove. Milton's distinction between *discursive* and *intuitive* has been already referred to (see **Discourse**). Which of our habitual convictions, or whether any, are really intuitive is a matter of controversy amongst philosophers, though the more constructive and reverential among them will be found generally on the side of intuition as regards some great and necessary truths. By this, however, will not be meant that the mind sees them if left altogether to itself, but that it does so at once and necessarily on being presented with them. The intuitions of infancy and childhood as the spring of our whole after being have been sublimely hymned by Wordsworth in his great ode on the intimations of immortality in childhood, commonly designated "The Platonic Ode."

¹ DE MORGAN, *Formal Logic*, p. 236.

Judgment. The faculty, as its very name implies, whereby the mind pronounces on its perceptions, and the various notions to which they give rise. It is easy to see that in such an act two of such notions must be brought together. To exercise judgment on any matter, I must affirm or deny something of it, and thus there are two elements brought together, the matter itself, and that which is affirmed or denied of it.

Judgments expressed in words are called *propositions*, and the two concepts which they bring together, *terms*. The consideration of them occupies what is generally made the second part of logic. The two terms are entitled respectively the subject and the predicate, or by the French the subject and the attribute.

Judgments are divided into *analytic* and *synthetic*. An analytic judgment is that in which the predicate is involved in the subject, as is the case with all definitions and many propositions besides. Such ought not to be regarded as tautologous, for, though in their case it is impossible to think the subject without recognising the predicate as a necessary constituent of the former, its being so is not always known till due consideration has been given, and a clear addition is thus made to our knowledge.

Synthetic judgments are such as bring together two notions of which the one does not involve the other, e. g. the rose is red. Neither the notion rose contains the notion red, nor does the latter the former. There is thus a synthesis of two concepts.

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Analytic and synthetic judgments have likewise been called respectively *reciprocal* or *substitutive*, and *attributive*.

Law. A general command or a general prohibition, the prescription of a general rule or a general procedure. “All things that are have some operation not violent or casual. Neither doth anything ever begin to exercise the same, without some fore-conceived end for which it worketh. And the end which it worketh for is not obtained unless the work be also fit to obtain it by. For unto every end every operation will not serve. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a law.¹ They who thus are accustomed to speak, apply the name of law unto that only rule of working which superior authority imposeth; whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof term any kind of rule or canon whereby actions are framed a law.”² Not moral agents alone, but the whole universe is under law; and Hooker, agreeably to his own definitions, pronounces God to work according to law, being a law to Himself. We thus come to speak of laws in Nature whensover we have discovered invariable sequence in outward phenomena. We say it is a law (the law of gravitation) in virtue of which an apple falls to

¹ HOOKER, *Eccl. Polity*, book i. c. 2, 1.

² Ibid., book i. c. 3, 1.

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the ground, a law of hydrostatics which raises water to the level of its spring, and hinders it from rising further. Concerning all which Archbishop Whately has the following :—“It” (law) “is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the statement of some *general fact*, the several individual instances of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, *analogous* to the conduct of persons in respect to a law which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak of ‘the laws of Nature.’ When we say that ‘a seed in vegetating directs the radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in compliance with a law of Nature,’ we only mean that such is *universally the fact*; and so, in other cases.

“It is evident, therefore, that, in this sense, the conformity of individual cases to the general rule is that which *constitutes* a law of Nature. If water should henceforth never become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water would no longer be a law of Nature: whereas in the other sense” (law imposed on moral agents) “a law is not the more or the less a law from the conformity or non-conformity of individuals to it. If an act of our legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly neglected by everyone, it would not on that account be the less a law.

“This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly stated, as hardly to need mention: yet writers of great note and ability have confounded these two senses together; I need only mention

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Hooker (in the opening of his great work) and Montesquieu: the latter of whom declaims on the much stricter observance in the universe of the laws of Nature, than in mankind of the Divine and human laws laid down for their conduct: not considering that, in the former case, it is the observance that *constitutes* the law.”¹

This is clever but fallacious. Whately confounds law of Nature with our knowledge of it, nay, with our enunciation of that knowledge. We have discovered an invariable fact, have we therefore discovered that there is no reason for that fact, or no one who because of the reason ordained the fact? One ingenious author seems to think it of the essence of law in the primary sense of the word that it should be possible to disobey it.

Whately might have seen the fallacy of his distinction, had he considered that our inferring the existence of a law in the primary sense may be as much the result of observation of facts as in the case of natural laws. A Frenchman may be supposed to come to England, and to live on such intimate terms with many, as to be cognisant of their methods of procedure, without having ever looked at the English laws regulating wills. But when he finds that every acquaintance on making his testamentary dispositions, has, at whatever expense of trouble, a couple of witnesses to attest the document, he will surely infer that such a provision is the con-

¹ WHATELY's *Logic*, Appendix, art. “Law.”

LAW.]

sequence of a law of some kind, whether statutory or by custom, a law the observance of which is requisite to give validity to the will. Yet Whately would hardly have said that the compliance with it is that which *constitutes* the law.

I have dwelt upon this because Whately's doctrine seems to me not merely an error but a mischievous one. We hear too much in the present day about law without recognition of its necessary correlative a lawgiver. Yet does not law imply mind? As law it is surely a thought, and can there be a thought without a thinker?

Liberty of the Will. One contrary to necessity as contingency is another. The two oppositions belong to different spheres of thought, and should not be confounded. For Liberty of the Will, see **Necessity and Will.**

Logic. Though various definitions have been given of this pursuit, there is now, I suppose, a pretty general tendency to acquiesce in that of Sir W. Hamilton. Pure logic according to him is "the science of formal thought" or "the science of the form of thought," therefore the science of the *λόγος*. It may also be called in a more limited view the science of science, any branch of knowledge rising to the dignity of a science when it is conformed to logical laws. Applied or mixed logic of course touches on many collateral subjects.

The study is as might be expected an ancient one. The Hindoos have cultivated it for a period probably of two thousand years if not more, their

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great luminary on the subject being a certain Gotama, about whose era we are in ignorance. It was with the Greeks, however, that the pursuit took the form which it has retained among Arabs, Jews, and Christians ever since; nor is there any reason to suppose that they were indebted to India for its acquisition. From the very nature of its subject, logic is a science that might well arise spontaneously in any community at once cultivated and acute; and the Hindoo logic, if we are to take Gotama for its interpreter, is so different from the Aristotelian, that the two must be considered independent growths. Zeno the Eleatic has been often spoken of as the founder of the Greek logic. Socrates and Plato were masters of it so far as division and definition rank among its essential parts. But Aristotle gave it the complete shape which it has worn ever since. Though this be so, he has neither defined it, nor bestowed on it the name *logic*, or indeed any one name, though he uses the adjective *λογικός*, and the adverb *λογικῶς*. The works of his in which the system is unfolded are now collectively styled the *Organon*, *instrument*, but this title is modern. They are as follows: 1st, the Categories; 2ndly, the treatise *de Interpretatione*;¹ 3rdly, the two books of Prior, and 4thly, the two of Posterior Analytics; 5thly, the eight books of Topics; and 6thly, the single book on Sophistici Elenchi. Allied to these, though not included in the *Organon*, is the treatise

¹ The genuineness of these two books has been questioned.

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on Rhetoric. Moreover, as might be expected, applications of his logical method are to be met with in great abundance throughout Aristotle's works. It is impossible to say when the title logic, λογική (properly an adjective τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, or πραγματεία being understood), first came into use. It is found in the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a commentator on Aristotle who lived in the second century, and it is said by Boëthius to have been introduced by the ancient Peripatetics.¹ It needs scarcely be said that it has established itself for ages, and has served to mark off logic from the other branches of mental science, such as psychology and metaphysics.

It is beside my purpose to trace the history of this science. It is generally known that the works of Aristotle were communicated to Western Europe by the Arabians, and read in Latin translations, and that logic after a time became sovereign of the schools. Devoted, however, though they were to the study, the schoolmen added little but some nice distinctions to its substance as bequeathed by Aristotle. But they enriched it with a most copious and felicitous terminology, and by formulating its leading principles in mnemonic verses.

At the termination of the scholastic period, the reaction as to logic took two directions, one that of trying to reform and improve the science,

¹ HAMILTON, *Logic*, Les. i. pp. 4, 5.

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the other that of neglecting and despising it. The efforts in the former of these, though made by men of great talents and influence, such as Ramus, led to nothing permanent. The neglect and contempt were but partial in their extent, Germany having never countenanced them, and must be considered to have on the whole passed away, a great reaction on the subject having taken place among ourselves, and many valuable logical works having been produced by some of our most distinguished men. Probably the last person of consequence who has ventured to speak of logic in the tone of Locke, Stewart, and Brown, was the late Lord Macaulay, in a well-known passage in his brilliant but most untrustworthy essay on Bacon. The reader who has been allured by it (the passage in question) should betake himself to Professor De Morgan's demolishing reply, which is nearly as witty as the sophistry which it crushed.¹

It is worthy too of remark that not only is the present age rich in logical works, but that it has seen the science itself enlarged and deepened, eminently by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Stanley Jevons.

Manner. We use this word to denote the mode or style in which anyone speaks or acts. It is also employed in the sense of *species* or *kind*, e. g. “all *manner* of four-footed beasts, &c.” Whence

¹ DE MORGAN, *Formal Logic*, pp. 216–224.

MANNER.]

is this derived? I think that the word thus used must come from *maneries*, by which term some of the schoolmen (such as John of Salisbury) denoted *species*. He derives it from *maneo*, and views it as signifying the state in which anything abides; the permanent character of anything. In this point of view the two meanings of manner will be seen not to be wholly unconnected.

Caught in the manner gives another sense of the word. It should be caught *with* the manner = *manour*, caught with the stolen article in the hand.

Matter. This word is used

1st. In opposition to *mind*. That which we believe to exist but not to be *mental* we call *material*.

2ndly. In opposition to *form*. That which is the basis of anything that exists, but is not distinct or specific till united with *form*. In this view it need not be material in the former sense. See **Form**.

It is in this last sense that we speak of the *materials* on which one has to work, of the *matter* of a discourse, of anything being *material* or *immaterial* to the question at issue.

Finally, in the question *What is the matter?* we are obviously employing the term in this the Aristotelian sense.

Maxim. This term with which we are all so familiar is of purely philosophical origin. The *τόποι* or *places* of Aristotle, the *loci communes* of the

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Latins, if shaped into propositions¹ were called by Boëthius the *maximæ propositiones*; also *propositiones supremæ, principales, indemonstrabiles, per se notæ*, which being admitted on all hands, were capable of serving as premisses in reasoning. “Maximas propositiones vocamus quæ et universales sunt, et ita notæ atque manifestæ, ut probatione non egeant, eaque potius quæ in dubitatione sunt probent.” Passing into the hands of the schoolmen, the substantive *propositio* was soon dropped, and the adjective came to be used substantively as a recognised term of art; the same thing having more or less contemporaneously occurred among the Greek logicians, with whom the *μέγισται προτάσεις* became simply *μέγισται*.

Metaphysics. The work of Aristotle which treats of the matters belonging to this science, taking its name in the strictest sense has for its title *τῶν ματὰ τὰ φυσικά—Of the things after the physics*. Different opinions exist as to when and by whom this title was first used for the book. It would be of more consequence to decide if we could what was meant by it. Did it mean that the work was to be placed after that on the physics? or to be read after it? Or did it refer to the subject, so that the things after or beyond such as are merely physical are to be treated therein? Anyhow, this title of the work in question is undoubtedly the origin of the word metaphysics.

¹ A distinction was drawn by some of the schoolmen between the *locus* and the *place*, for which see *Topic*.

METAPHYSICS.]

By Aristotle his subject is called “the first Philosophy” as being the ground of all especial sciences. It treats of Being as such, independently of all particular determinations and accidents, and of its necessary conditions. It is thus nearly identical with what we now call **Ontology**, and includes pure Theology.

In recent times the meaning of the word metaphysics has been much extended, and it has been made to include nearly if not quite every branch of mental science. And as at the close of last century and throughout the earlier part of this, psychology was the one most studied, he was called a metaphysician who inquired into the origin of our thoughts and beliefs, the laws of association, and kindred matters. Stewart, though aware of the other sphere of science to which the name had formerly been appropriated, yet announced his determination not merely to include psychology under the name metaphysics, but mainly to denote it thereby, and it is as a psychologist far more than as an authority in other branches of philosophy that he has won his fame. He tells us in the preface to his *Dissertations* that “by metaphysics he understands the inductive philosophy of the human mind.” D’Alembert says that “the aim of metaphysics is to examine the generation of our ideas, and to show that they all come from sensations.”¹

If the title metaphysics is to be bestowed on

¹ FLEMING, *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, sub voce.

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psychology at all, it can only be as denoting the genus of which that is to be considered a species, the said genus being mental science in general. In this case metaphysics in the old sense of the word must be called as in the present day it very frequently is, ontology. There is, however, a risk of error and confusion in setting aside the nomenclature of ages, and I think it better to call all speculations about the origin of our thoughts, the laws of association, the phenomena of memory, and the like, *psychological*, and to use the words metaphysics and metaphysical in their old sense, as denoting the first philosophy of Aristotle, which is occupied with the subject of Being as such, irrespective of all particular determinations or phenomena.

Few I apprehend are found to speak sneeringly of this science, who have not an incapacity greater than ordinary of following its investigations. Without entering into a general defence and maintenance of their importance, I must remark that they are in close connection with the fundamental truths of the Gospel. And therefore, though no man would say that those truths are not sparingly embraced by multitudes of whom we should not dream of demanding metaphysical knowledge or speculation, it must needs be that when the Christian theology is to be set forth and vindicated, an aptitude for and an intimacy with these are imperatively required.

The adjective *metaphysical*, as is known to his

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readers, is used by Shakespeare in the sense of *supernatural*.

“ Which fate and *metaphysical* aid doth seem
To have thee crowned withal.”

Macbeth, act i. scene 8.

This use was not confined to Shakespeare,¹ and seems to have obtained not only in English, but in later Greek and Latin as well. Though it gives a different meaning from that with which we are engaged, it is one in like accordance with the formation of the word.

To return to our subject, the young student may perhaps ask whether he should say *metaphysics* or *metaphysic*. The latter form has been recently imported to us from abroad. We are not very consistent in this matter of singular or plural in our names of sciences formed in the same way as *metaphysic* or *metaphysics*. Thus we say *rhetoric* and *logic*,² but not often *mathematic*, and never, so far as I know, *politic*, *mechanic*, *dynamic*, or *optic*. The case stands thus. These names in Greek are all adjectives with substantives understood, and are therefore in the singular or plural according as would be those substantives were they expressed. If we suppose them singular, such as *τέχνη* or *ἐπιστήμη*, then the adjective will be singular; and if plural, such as *πράγματα*, it will of course be plural. Now we cannot preserve

¹ See JOHNSON'S *Dictionary*, sub voce.

² The University of Dublin, aiming I suppose at consistency, speaks of *Logics*, or did so some time ago.

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the sense of the names in question, as adjectives, and if we did our adjectives take no plural form. We have been guided by no fixed rule, and such being the case, it is more sensible to follow custom than to aim at consistency which we shall not succeed in reaching, and which would be but a trifling gain, supposing that we could. Custom I apprehend still dictates saying *metaphysics*.

Metempsychosis. A Greek word for that which we, adopting the Latin one, more usually call the *transmigration* of souls.

Method. (*Méθodos* a *transit*, a *following after*, from *μετά* and *δός*.) The word is used by Plato both for a scientific inquiry, and for the mode of prosecuting such, in which latter sense it has continued to this day. In a kindred one it is applied to practical action. One man is said to be *methodical* in the management of business, another not. It is, however, with the question of acquiring knowledge or prosecuting science that we are at present concerned, and for success in either it will not be disputed that method is requisite. It becomes therefore important to know what it is.

Method is to be distinguished from *order*. Any arrangement, any assignment to each thing of a particular place, no matter how irrespective of the relations of the things to each other, comes under the head of order. Method on the other hand demands that the arrangement should be in accordance with those relations. “Methodus

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differt ab ordine; quia ordo facit ut unam rem dis-
eamus post aliam; methodus ut unam *per* aliam.”¹

There are two great constituents of method which move counter to each other, but whose combination is essential to the attainment of science. These are analysis and synthesis. By the former process we resolve a whole into its constituent elements; by the latter we combine those elements into the whole. The movements no doubt are counter to each other, but the operation of both is essential to the attainment of real knowledge. In the choice of these processes, we must be greatly influenced by our aim. Method is requisite both for the acquisition and for the communication of knowledge. It will sometimes happen that the methods for each are counter to each other. I have constructed by synthesis the result into which varying elements combine. That result stands before my disciple, and the aim is to exhibit to him the different elements which in their combination produce it. Or I analyze the object before me into its elements, this done, I teach best by putting those elements together, and displaying to the learner the result into which they combine.

An anticipatory idea, a point of departure is also requisite, as Coleridge has shown to method. This he illustrates in a comparison between educated, and uneducated, utterance.

¹ *Facciolati Rudimenta Logicae*, quoted by HAMILTON, *Metaph.* vol. i. p. 96.

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The name *methodist* has been applied to two very different sets of persons. The physicians in ancient times who grounded their practice entirely by rule and system were called *μεθοδικοί*, which pretty much answers to our word *methodists*. (See **Dogma**.) And the modern sect of *Methodists* received the title from the strict and exact methods of piety practised by Wesley and his friends at Oxford, their rigid observance of fasts and festivals, and the like.

The great treatises on method are that of Des Cartes, that in the *Port Royal Logic*, Coleridge *Intr. to Encycl. Metropol.*, reprinted separately, and also to be found in the *Friend*, vol. iii., and Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*, vol. ii.

Modal, Modality. The distinction between a pure proposition, simply asserting and denying something, and one which does the like qualifying the act of doing so by stating the necessity, the impossibility, or the contingency, of the assertion or denial, has led to all those latter cases being called *modals*. It is now generally, but not universally, admitted that the distinction belongs to the matter and not to the form of thought, and that in consequence the consideration of it lies outside the domain of pure logic. Considerable stress, however, is laid upon it by Aristotle, and a very difficult part of the first book of *Prior Analytics* is the result. Indeed, the intrusion of this subject into the syllogistic scheme has led to such an amount of subtlety and difficulty that the

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schoolmen had a saying “*de modali non gustabit asinus*,” for which Sir W. Hamilton proposes to substitute “*de modali non gustabit logicus*.” See **Contingency**.

Monad (*μονάς*), a unit. The term is a technical one in ancient Greek theology, and in a different application in the philosophy of Leibnitz. It is beyond the province of this work to discuss his **Monadology**.

Mood. The quantity and quality of its propositions constitute the **mood** of a syllogism, as distinguished from its **figure**, which depends on the position of the middle term. Thus *celarent* and *cesare* are in the same mood, though in different figures.

Moral. In its highest sense this word is synonymous with ethical. That is derived from *ἠθος*, which signifies both *temper*, *character*, and *habit*, *manner*, *custom*, in which sense it is equivalent to the Latin *mōs*, from which our word *moral* is derived. Indeed the substantive *morals* is the translation of *mores* when the latter denotes ethical habits or manners. Aristotle calls attention to the slightness of difference between the words *ἦθος* and *ἠθος*, and considers *ἦθος*, *habit* or *custom*, as the creator of *ἠθος*, *character*.¹

Moral bears another meaning. We apply it to a truth neither necessary nor in the full sense universal. We speak of moral as distinguished from demonstrative evidence, and moral as dis-

¹ *Eth. Nic.* ii. 1. See too PLATO, *Laws*, vii. 792 E.

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tinguished from full universality. "Dans une matière contingente, on se contente d'une universalité morale."¹ In this sense it corresponds very much with the ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ πολύ of Aristotle, and with our *general* and *in general*.

How the word *moral* came to be applied in this sense is a question on which I have not succeeded in getting much light. A friend suggests that it may have originated in the distinction between ethical and necessary truth, the former, as Aristotle warns his readers,² being unsusceptible of the accurate investigation and determination which can be applied to the latter, and hence the adjective *moral* may have had its meaning extended to all matter in the same situation, to all that is contingent.

Motion. The *κίνησις* of ancient philosophy meant change of any kind, whether external or internal, whether in situation or condition. In this view our modern word locomotion is not redundant, for it denotes one species of the genus. We still apply the kindred words to marked effects on the feelings, as when we say, "He was much moved," and the like; but with inanimate objects we confine it to movement in space.

Necessary, Necessity. The schoolmen distinguished between two kinds of necessity, *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis*. The former is a relation between thoughts, judgments, and

¹ *La Logique, ou l'Art de Penser*, Port Royal, c. iii.

² *Eth. Nic.* i. 3.

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propositions, the relation of premisses to a conclusion, the latter a relation between things and events, the relation of cause and effect. In the former case necessity does not involve truth. Suppose the syllogism to be good as such, it may have false premisses, and from those premisses there may come a conclusion as false as themselves, but it will necessarily follow from them. I might say, "All Englishmen love liberty; Philip II. was an Englishman, therefore Philip II. loved liberty," in which case my minor premiss and my conclusion would both be startlingly false, but the conclusion would be a necessary result of the premisses. In strictly abstract matter necessity always prevails, and its nature is such that we feel not only what is propounded to be true, but that there would be contradiction and absurdity in supposing it otherwise. Necessary truth as such is universal. There may be no triangles in a distant fixed star, but if there are we are sure that their three angles must be together equal to two right angles. Of course only what is necessary admits of demonstration.

Moral necessity is that which is commonly meant when we speak of *the doctrine of necessity*. According to that doctrine, motives act as *forces* on the conduct, the relation between the two being strictly that of cause and effect. When two motives are present, as when two forces, the strongest will prevail. The whole universe, the moral and spiritual no less than the physical, is

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thus one adamantine chain of causes and effects.
(See **Liberty** and **Will**.)

The contrary of the former, which may be called logical necessity, is contingency; of the latter, moral necessity, is liberty. Most people, of whom I confess I am one, view the latter as involved in the very idea of will. Indeed the necessitarian cannot be said to recognise will at all, since he makes the dependence of conduct on motive immediate, and he can therefore only mean by will susceptibility of motive.

Negative, Negation. The negative is the asserting the absence, as the positive is the presence, of one thing in another. There is no possibility of thinking a mere negative. It must be always of something real or imagined that we do so.

Pure negation must be distinguished from privation. That can only be predicated of a subject which ought to possess the attribute, power, or capacity, in question. We do not speak of blindness or privation of sight in a plant or a mineral, nor as moral evil is the privation of moral good, do we affirm it of beings incapable of such moral good. We do not in sober earnest call the tiger or the hyæna morally bad. But we feel disapprobation of the dog when he offends us, because he seems to us to have some capacity of moral goodness.

To return to the negative. The considerations connected with it are more important than might

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at first sight be supposed. What is meant by saying that it is more difficult to prove a negative than an affirmative? This must be understood with much qualification. It is easier to prove a particular negative than an universal affirmative, and to do the latter involves what is meant by *proving a negative* when the difficulty of doing so is asserted. It is also easier to prove a particular affirmative than an universal negative. These truths, however, are not so much based on a comparison between affirmatives and negatives, as on one between particulars and universals.

When then the difficulty is asserted of proving a negative, or when one says, "I cannot be called on to prove a negative," what is meant is this. It is impossible to prove the negative of a mere possibility, nor is there any reason for attempting to do so. It is the same truth as is expressed in the maxim, "De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio." Of things not apparent, of any mere possibility, it is for you to show the actual existence, not for me to disprove it. This consideration is a weighty element in the laws of evidence, and is one by which a sane mind will be guided in the conduct of life. There are, however, cases where we must reverse our rule and keep in mind that we have not proved a negative, and that till we have done so we are not entitled to arrive at some conclusion towards which we are inclining. This holds in regard

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to inductions drawn from inadequate examination of instances, as if, to use Bacon's illustration, Samuel had contented himself with seeing the six sons of Jesse, and omitted to ask whether there was yet another. We are called on too to prove a negative before we reject that of which we have evidence good and sufficient of itself, but are confronted with a difficulty or an objection, which a possible fact would at once remove if we were aware of it. This is a consideration of great importance in dealing with history, and especially, as I need scarcely say, with sacred history. Our perplexities in these cases do not result from the positive grounds which we have to consider, but from *lacunæ* in our knowledge the filling up of which would make all clear. In such cases it is for the objector to prove a negative or it may be several negatives.

Nominalism. The position opposed to realism, denying the reality of all universals. The more moderate nominalists, of whom Ockham is the representative, only rejected the independent existence of these, but admitted that there were such conceptions in the mind. (See **Conceptualism**.) The extreme nominalists such as probably Roscelin, and certainly Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, denied even the latter position. See **Realism**.

Notion. When he uses the words *notio* and *notiones* in philosophical discussion, Cicero tells us that he does so as the Latin equivalent for the Greek ἔννοια and πρόληψις, the latter of course not in the sense

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of *anticipation*. We may consider notion therefore as nearly synonymous with the result of conception. A notion is a concept. The word, however, is often used in a somewhat vague range of meaning.

In conversation it is often synonymous with *opinion*. "He has many strange *notions*." This is quite outside any philosophical use. Like idea too, it is often still further diverted from its true meaning by being employed for *liking*, chiefly, however, in negative declarations. "I have no *notion* of waiting for him a whole afternoon."

Objective and **Subjective**. That is spoken of as objective which is presented as an *object*, and that to which the presentation is made as being affected by it is called the *subject*. According to the Kantian philosophy the mind is the only subject, and therefore all that is external to it if known at all is known only *subjectively*.

The words objective and subjective are the creation of the schoolmen, and their use would be better restrained to scholastic discussion, than extended as now to all sorts of discourse, in which they do not seem to mean more than outward and inward, distinct from the mind or in the mind. They are awkward in their form, though that is no objection to them as terms of art.

As terms of art indeed their revival has been hailed both by Coleridge and Sir W. Hamilton.

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It has not always been noticed, however, that the said revival has been accompanied by what is almost a reversal of their meaning. By the schoolmen the outward taken by itself was spoken of as taken *subjectively*, viewed as in itself, apart from the perceiving and thinking mind. The thing in itself is *τοῦ ὑποκείμενον*, the thing as perceived and thought is *objective*. This, as may easily be seen, has been reversed in modern language. The old scholastic force of the terms survived among English writers down to the middle of the seventeenth century. Thus speaks the celebrated Mede, “Though the Eucharist be a sacrifice (that is, an oblation wherein the offerer banquets with his God), yet is Christ in this sacrifice no otherwise offered, than by way of commemoration only of his sacrifice once offered upon the Cross, as a learned prelate of ours¹ hath lately written *objective* only, not *subjective*.”

How completely this reverses the polemical terms of the present day I need not show.

Ontology. The science of Being as such—the same therefore as metaphysics in the old sense of that word. Aristotle uses neither name for that which he calls *the first Philosophy*, and which he defines as a science, *περὶ τοῦ ὄντος γῆς ὄντος*—concerning Being as such. This received the name *metaphysics* from the title given to Aristotle’s work on the subject. But Wolf enlarged the meaning of that word so as to make it include all the branches

¹ Bishop Morton.

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of mental science, and is generally considered the introducer of the term *ontology* to denote the one now before us. See **Metaphysics**.

Optimism. The doctrine that the universe, being created by perfect Wisdom and Goodness, must not only be good but the best possible. “A less good compared with a greater is evil,” a position which it would be hard to prove. Optimism was the creed of Malebranche and of Leibnitz, and is thrown into poetical form by Pope in the “*Essay on Man*,” the philosophy of which was imparted by Bolingbroke. Its tendency it is shrewdly suspected was not understood by the accomplished artist himself. Here moral evil itself is brought into the net of optimism.

“ If plagues or earthquakes break not Heaven’s design,
 Why then a Borgia, or a Catiline ?
 Who knows but He, Whose hand the lightning forms,
 Who heaves old ocean, and Who wings the storms ;
 Pours fierce ambition in a Caesar’s mind,
 Or turns young Ammon loose to scourge mankind ? ”

This creed was turned into ridicule by Voltaire, in his *Candide*. I am not aware that the question is now frequently raised, and it is in some degree an idle one. Both parties will frequently intend the very same thing. One man may say, “The universe, being the work of perfect Wisdom and Goodness, must needs be the best possible.” His antagonist may say, “Perfect Wisdom and Goodness may have had reasons for not making it the best possible;” to which the first might rejoin, “If

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so, it *is* the best possible, for nothing can be possible except what perfect Wisdom and Goodness decrees, and nothing could have such reasons in its favour as those which dictate such decrees." There is also a considerable ambiguity in the very term *optimism*, the kind of goodness in question being left undefined.

The utmost, I think, which we can venture to say is that the universe is the best possible, in a conflict with moral evil, and that all the temporary turns of that conflict will be overruled for good, so that perfection will be the final issue. Why moral evil has been permitted is a deep and difficult question. Whether or not we think that we can answer it, we must never allow ourselves to regard it as other than evil.

Pantheism. The identification of the universe, τὸν πᾶν, *the all*, with God. This creed has appeared in nearly all ages, and in every country where thought and meditation have been habitual; in Hindostan, in Greece, and among the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, in more modern times, and largely in the present day.

It takes different forms, sometimes merging the universe in God, sometimes, and it is to be feared oftener, merging God in the universe. The former is perhaps the pantheism of Spinoza and of some of his followers, and in the mere statement does not involve atheism. But the things around us attest their reality by so strong a pressure, and self-consciousness so enforces our own existence

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upon us, that it is to be feared few can remain at this pole of pantheism, and when it is once quitted there will be an immediate flight to the other, and our God will be the universe, and the universe only. Whatever poetical forms this scheme may assume, however delightful to think of one spirit in stars and in flowers, in bird, beast, and insect, as well as in man, it cannot amount to a recognition of the one living and true God of Revelation, the Jehovah who spake to Moses from the burning bush, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. To approach the God of the Bible we must believe in One who is at once the author of the universe and distinct from it. A spirit pervading all the world and identical with it, cannot be the object of prayer, of repentance, or of love.

No doubt though such pantheism be atheism, it is atheism disguised, and can assume such poetical aspect, as to present great charm in certain moods of the mind. Hence poets fall into it we may often suppose unconsciously. The well-known lines of Pope :

“ All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul,
That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth, as in the ethereal frame,
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent,”

come very near to pantheism, and, as far as

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here quoted, are only redeemed from it by the clause “spreads undivided.” There is no reason to believe that Pope, who is largely acquitted of understanding the real scope of his “Essay on Man,” intended here anything but real theism ; and in another passage he expressly guards himself against pantheism, saying,

“ The worker from the work distinct was known,
And simple reason never sought but one.”

So too Wordsworth’s

“ — something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of Man,
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things,”

approaches pantheism, if it does not reach it. By pantheism the whole poetry of Shelley is avowedly pervaded.

Paralogism. Transgression in argument of logical law, its two species being *fallacy* and *sophism*. See **Fallacy**.

Passion. *Passio.* The Latin equivalent etymologically considered to the Greek *πάθος*. The *πάθη* in Greek philosophy were therefore what we should now call *the passions*, but the force of the term extended somewhat farther. *Πάθος* meant not only mental feeling, but every form of

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being acted on, as opposed to acting, every case in which if the subject be the nominative, a passive not an active verb will be demanded. Hence Aristotle speaks of the *πάθη* of inanimate things. Generally, however, the term was used to denote mental affections. Cicero rendered the *πάθη* by *perturbationes*. Augustine tells us that some used this word, others denoted the same things by *affectiones*, and others *passiones*, which last is the one employed by himself.¹ It has held its ground, and the *passions* may be considered the received psychological term for generic mental affections.

These, however, have been for the most part treated in a limited way. As they are only distinctly seen and observed when they manifest themselves forcibly, it is to such forcible manifestation that moral philosophers have in great measure confined themselves. To this they may have been further led by Cicero's name for them, *perturbationes*. But properly speaking, all mental affection caused by external things, all mental condition which is not *act* but *being acted on*, should be regarded as *πάθος*.

It is, however, in pronounced manifestation, as I have said, that these are distinctly seen, that they are felt to be universal ingredients in human nature, and that they admit of classification. The rough enumeration made by Aristotle,² has on

¹ AUG. *De Civitate Dei*, L. ix. c. 4. ² ETH. NIC. ii. 5.

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the whole been adhered to. One would not look to Collins's Ode for accurate philosophy, but he gives pretty much the list of passions commonly recognised. The admission of some mental states into that list is questionable. Hope seems more of a disposition and frequently even of a habit than a passion. It exists independently of any present action of the outward. Love on the other hand, though in part the result of such, is itself quite as much *act as passion*.

The passions naturally attract the notice of the philosopher when he begins to treat of the active powers. This may at first sight seem strange, inasmuch as passion and action are each other's opposites. But though the passions are, no doubt, in themselves results upon us, they are such results as by their very nature lead us into action, even as the external air entering into and dilating our lungs forces them into movement. Mere thought stays by itself. Emotion prompts at least to action if action be within our power. Moving us it stirs us, and each form of stirring has its appropriate action. The tendency to the action, and perhaps the comparative ability of its performance, will be as the strength of the passion. When a man of general capacity is unusually deficient in the performance of some acts mental or bodily demanding no more natural power than many not very different in kind in which he excels, the cause is to be found in an

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apathy greater than common as regards the matter with which they are concerned.

In so far as passions are elementary we cannot without blasphemy regard them as evil. When evil, it is because they are not directed to their proper objects or are allowed in an unseemly excess. Envy is grief, and grief for a worthy cause is no sin, but the prosperity, or the popularity of another, or the admiration bestowed on him, are no fit objects of the passion. Even fear, one of the basest affections when it exists to a marked extent, has its legitimate scope in a cautious conduct. Anger when within bounds is but the right sentiment towards moral evil.

The word *passion* is used very commonly in a limited sense, and is confined to the one emotion of anger, and a *passionate man* denotes in ordinary speech one who is prone to ebullitions of rage. A melancholy indication of the fact that anger is at once the most frequent and the strongest and most visible *perturbatio* among men.

Another use of the word is to denote mere suffering of pain, other *passiones* not being taken account of. In this use it is limited to our Lord and Saviour, of whose Cross and *Passion* we speak in moments of solemnity.

Απάθεια, from α privative and *πάθος*, denotes of course the absence of passion. *Apathy* and *apathetic* convey in common language the notions

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of stupidity and sluggishness, and would be ordinarily regarded as denying activity or energy. It was of course otherwise in the cases of the ancient Stoics and Pyrrho.

Impassible likewise denotes the absence of passion but further the insusceptibility of it, and is applied to God, Who must be always thought of as pure energy or act. It is the word used in the Latin of Article 1, the English giving us as its equivalent “without passions.” For the sense in which this is to be held, see **Anthropomorphism**.

Perception. The mental act whereby a sensation is referred to its cause, and the recognition of an *object* effected. It must not be confounded with conception, though it is sure to produce that. (See **Conception**.) Some of the most curious questions in philosophy gather round the subject of perception.

Person, Personality. The word *person* has an interesting history. Originally it signified a mask, and was given to that worn by actors, appropriate to the character which they represented, answering to the Greek *πρόσωπον*, a *face*, which was applied in the same way. From this it passed to the character sustained, as in the phrase *dramatis personæ*. Hence a man was said to sustain such and such a *person* according to the part which he had to play in such and such circumstances. A further development of meaning took place in

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Roman law, wherein it was applied to the parties in a lawsuit, and in criminal cases to the agent as compared with the act. All this would of itself, I think, tend to bring it to its ultimate and prevailing sense, that of a single intelligent subsistence, even had it not come to that very early, as may, I think, be easily shown. There are passages in Polybius, in the New Testament, and in the Apostolical Fathers, to say nothing of Cicero, where it can hardly be understood in any other. Hence the parson—the *persona exemplaris* of his parish. It also had at times the meaning of a distinguished or dignified character. This last, however, is but collateral and accidental to its main history, which undoubtedly brought it to the meaning already stated, and which it habitually bears with us. In this its ultimate force it has thus been defined: “An intelligent agent, having the distinctive character of I, Thou, He; and not divided nor distinguished into intelligent agents capable of the same characters.”¹

The theological must also have had a considerable bearing on the general history of the word. The Latin formula for the Trinity was and is “three Persons and one God,” and the discussions both of the truth itself against its gainsayers, and of the terms by which it was to be expressed, which were the sources of misunderstanding between East and West most naturally led to inquiries

¹ WATERLAND, “Second Defence of Some Queries,” *Works*, vol. iii. p. 339.

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into what is meant by the words *person* and *personality*.

As applied to us they involve, no doubt, the notion of separate substance in each individual. But though this be so in our case, we must regard the fact as but an accident of created being. In God the accidents which make distinct personality involve division of substance do not exist, but the distinction of personality is none the less real. Nay, we cannot doubt that the distinction is clearer and the personalities fuller than with us. To discuss this, however, would be beyond the limits of the present occasion.

Personality is a most important element of morals. To distinguish between persons and things is a primary condition of all ethical inquiry. And so too, the distinction lies at the basis of good law. Hence the wrong of slavery, and the evil of arbitrary power.

Phenomenon, (better *phænomenon*, from *φανόμενον*) *made to appear*, as a substantive, *an appearance*. Conversationally we denote by the word a striking or unusual appearance. In the Kantian philosophy it is used in contradistinction to *noumenon*. Things become known to us only by the phenomena by which they address themselves to our perceptive faculties, but we are constrained by the laws of our mind to infer from such phenomena that there are *noumena*, things understood or conceived, of which the others are the manifestations; from appearances we infer the existence

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of something which is the ground and cause of them, which something, however, cannot be known in itself.

Pneumatology. See **Psychology.**

Possible. Impossible. Of these there are three kinds. The *metaphysical*, the *physical*, and the *moral*. A thing is metaphysically possible or impossible according as it does or does not involve contradiction in thought. An animal whose eyes are at the tip of the tail is metaphysically possible; a circle with unequal radii is metaphysically impossible. Physical possibility or impossibility consists in the matter in question being within or beyond the sphere of natural laws and the range of natural forces. It is physically impossible that a man should fly in the air from London to York. Moral possibility or impossibility relates to that quasi and practical universality which is denoted by the epithet *moral* in one of its senses (see **Moral**). From the nature of the case it relates much to mind and conduct. Thus while it is as physically possible for an eminently just man to commit a fraud as for any other, we pronounce it *morally impossible*. At the same time, we use it in the sense of *moral* already referred to, for what is so improbable as to be practically impossible. It is *morally impossible* that all the world should have been deceived as to the existence of Napoleon Buonaparte, in spite of the strong case that has been made out against it.¹

¹ *Vide WHATELY's Historic Doubts.*

Postulate. *Διηγμα.* A self-evident proposition regarding something to be done, a problem, as *axiom* is regarding theory. See **Axiom**.

Potential, Potentiality. Existing *virtually*, *δυνάμει*, as opposed to existing *actually*, *ἐνεργείᾳ*.

Potentiality is different from possibility. Everything is possible the supposition of which does not involve contradiction in thought. But that only has a *potential* existence, of whose nature such potentiality forms a part. Thus the oak is continued potentially in the acorn, not in the beech-nut.

Predicament. *Predicamentum* is the Latin equivalent of *category*. Hence the *ten predicaments* mean the *ten categories*. In modern conversation (I suppose scarcely in writing), the word has acquired the sense of *disagreeable situation*. A *predicament* is understood to mean a *scrape*. When or how this arose it may be difficult to say. Shakespeare, in the "Merchant of Venice," uses the word in a sense somewhat intermediate to its technical and its modern colloquial signification :

"In which *predicament* I say thou stand'st."

In French, *predicament* is conversationally used as with us in the sense of *situation*, but equally for a pleasant and an unpleasant one.

Predicate. That which is affirmed or denied of the subject—in French, *attribut*.

Principle. *Principium*, like *ἀρχή*, means beginning.

As a philosophical term Aristotle defines *ἀρχή* as that first source from which anything is, or

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becomes, or is known. Everything that exists must have its ground in something antecedent, be it cause, condition, or element; and every article of faith or knowledge must proceed from some previous conviction, which as the point of departure for proof cannot be proved itself, but at the same time cannot be disbelieved: principles have therefore been divided into *principia essendi*, and *principia cognoscendi*. To these might be added *principia agendi*, or principles of conduct. We say of a man that he is well principled or has good principles, whose behaviour is regulated by the true laws of morality, and that he is unprincipled if it be not. This latter term is sufficient to describe the grand majority of the immoral and wicked. It is the want of subjection to principle which renders their actions bad, and their characters reprehensible. Such want causes their conduct to be determined not by fixed law, but by passion, by circumstance, by temptation, by self-interest, real or imagined. This, rather than regulation by evil principles, is the state of matters with them. If any have gone further, if they have deliberately called evil good, and acted accordingly, then the word *unprincipled* becomes an inadequate description of them, they should be called ill principled, people of bad principles.

The writers of the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the last century seem to have recognised a verb to *principle*. Thus Locke speaks not only of *principled* but of *principling*.

Privative. στερητικός. This term is used by Aristotle synonymously with ἀποφατικός, *negative*, in opposition to κατηγορικός, which with him always bears the sense of affirmative; στερητικός, however, was afterwards used in opposition to ξένος, and received the force of *privative*. Between mere negative and privative there is this broad distinction, that we only apply the latter to the want or absence of something which it is natural for the subject to possess. Blindness is privation of sight, and we only employ the word in speaking of creatures whose nature it is to see. We talk indeed of a man being *stone blind*, but we should never think of saying that a stone is blind.

Probable, Probability. In conversation we usually employ these words as mere synonyms of *likely* and *likelihood*. In philosophy, however, they have a range of meaning from much less to much more, in the way of belief and conviction, than is attached to those others. When any supposed case is possible, then a probability in its favour is constituted by any consideration, however slight, that makes for it; even though the likelihood is all to the contrary. From this lowest step on the scale probability mounts up to such an accumulation and such a force of favourable considerations, as produces entire conviction in the mind that entertains them. The word probability therefore may mean much less, and much more, than likelihood. Where it does the latter, where the considerations which constitute the probability

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produce conviction, the difference between such conviction and mathematical certainty lies not in the state of mind or the amount of belief, but in the character of the arguments which have produced it. Probable arguments are generically different from necessary ones, though they may produce equal assurance. They differ because they can be rejected without involving contradiction, and their effects may often be different on different minds. Nevertheless they are the only arguments which can be brought to bear on contingent matter, and with contingent matter by far the greater part, if not the whole of practical life, is concerned. Hence as Butler says, "Probability is the very guide of life." It does not follow, however, from this, that we are to make no difference between a strong sense of likelihood, and thorough mental satisfaction, in cases where only the latter will justify our acting, such, for example, as finding guilty the prisoner at the bar.

Problem. *πρόβλημα* from *προβάλλω* *to project, to propose.* Hence problem means besides something projecting or standing out, something put forth or proposed, sometimes something to be done in practical life, as when Orestes, in the *Electra* of Euripides, calls the awful task set before him a *problem*.¹ In mathematical science, a problem is in like manner something to be done, the formation, for example, of an equilateral triangle, as

¹ EURIP. *Electra*, 989.

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distinguished from a *theorem* or speculative truth, such as that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. With Aristotle, *problem* means *question*. A problem with him is something which may be true, but has to be proved. This sense remains in the adjective *problematical*, *requiring to be made out, or proved*. As *quæstio* is the Latin equivalent to *problem*, so *questionable* would seem to be synonymous with *problematical*. In our general use, however, the former implies something unfavourable, a tendency to reject that to which the term is applied. *Questionable taste* and *questionable morality* all but mean bad taste and bad morality. *Problematic*, on the other hand, merely signifies that the point before us needs proof, without at all denoting the likelihood of its failing of such proof.

Property. This name is given in logic to a predicate, which, without being either genus, differentia, or species, necessarily accompanies their combination, as distinguished from *accident*, which does not. Aristotle requires of a property that it be convertible with the subject, and therefore peculiar to it. Porphyry gives four senses of property.

1st. An attribute belonging to one only species, though not to every specimen—as medical or geometrical skill to man.

2nd. An attribute belonging to the whole species, though not to it alone—as *biped* to man.

3rd. One belonging to the whole, and to it

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alone, but not to be found always, as growing grey-haired to man.

4thly. One belonging to the whole species, to it alone, and universally—as risibility to man. This last, he says, is strictly (*κυρίως*) property, and to this, following Aristotle, he confines himself in his subsequent treatment of the matter.

Proposition. An expressed judgment. A judgment consists of two notions or concepts, of which one is the subject and the other the predicate, and when it is expressed or *propounded*, these are named *terms*.

As we have two verbs derived from the same Latin one, *to propound* and *to propose*, and two corresponding substantives *proposition* and *proposal*, it would have been desirable to keep the two latter distinct, confining the one to its relation to *propound*, and the other to its relation to *propose*, just as we keep distinct the words *exposition* and *exposal* or *exposure*, and *composition* and *composure*, these being respectively the substantives corresponding to the verbs *expound*, *expose*, *compound*, *compose*.¹ In the case of *proposition* and *proposal* the distinction has been unfortunately lost sight of. We find *proposition* used for *proposal* as far back as Clarendon, and by the newspaper and parliamentary orators of the present day such use is so general, that it seems as hopeless swimming against the stream to resist it. Nevertheless, as a language always gains both in precision and strength by the existence and ob-

¹ This, however, we do but partially.

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servance of distinctions, I think it would be well to attend to that now before us.

Psychology. The science of the $\psi v \chi \gamma$ or soul. It sometimes has been called *pneumatology*, but that name is by no means so happy as the one now before us. Psychology is engaged with all the manifestations of mind, distinct from the logical process which furnishes materials for its own science logic, and from the illumination and the ideas of reason. Sensation, perception, memory, and the laws of association, all come within its province. At the end of last century, and the beginning of this, it was very commonly, but very inaccurately, called *metaphysics*, the name of a distinct branch of philosophy. See **Metaphysics**.

Quality. **Quantity.** These words, though common in modern conversation, are in their origin wholly scientific. Cicero accompanies his employment of the former with a sort of apology.¹ He states it to be, as it is, the translation of the Greek $\pi \omega \nu \gamma \eta \varsigma$, which he says is also a philosophical word, not one of ordinary life. The latter (quantity) is the commoner in modern conversation of the two, and is there sometimes abusively employed to denote not *any quantity*, but a great one. In the true use of the word the smallest is as much characterized by quantity as the largest amount of anything.

Realism. This word is used to denote very different things.

1st. Realism is opposed to *nominalism*, and means

¹ *Acad.* i. 6, 7.

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the attribution of reality to universals, as the latter term means the denial of such. This was the great philosophical controversy of the Middle Ages.

2ndly. Realism is used in opposition to *idealism*, and in such case means the attribution of external reality to matter, as opposed to idealism, the doctrine of Berkeley and others, which denies this; also the immediacy of perception, without the interposition of a mental representation, according to what used to be called the ideal theory.

3rdly. Realism has been lately used in æsthetic criticism, as opposed to *idealism* in art. Realistic pictures are such as aim at reproducing exact facts, instead of exhibiting ideals.

It is singular that in the two last usages, the words *idea* and *ideal* take the opposite place to that which they would occupy in the old controversy of realism and nominalism, for the mediæval realist was the idealist.

Reason. This word, like the Latin *ratio*, from which it is derived, runs through a great variety of meanings, sometimes standing for the whole faculty of thought, sometimes for the right exercise of that faculty, and sometimes for the ground of beliefs or conclusions. On these, however, I need not pause at present, as they must be discernible to anyone who will be at the trouble of watching the employment of the word either in books or in common conversation.

But in modern philosophy, since Kant and

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Jacobi, it is used in a more limited sense, to denote the seat in our minds of first principles, of *a priori* intuitions, of the necessary and the universal, of ideas. The verbal distinctions in German between *vernunft* and *verstand*, in English between *reason* and *understanding*, corresponding to that of the Greeks between *νόος* and *διάνοια*, are modern in their fixed form, and their propriety has been questioned, but the distinction between the things meant has been recognised in nearly every philosophy not purely empirical.

The doctrine of an universal reason higher than the individual's understanding, but by which that is enlightened, a reason impersonal in each man, but participated in by every man, is found in the earlier Fathers, in the writings of Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Norris, and is insisted on with continued reiteration by Coleridge. It appears too, in seats of higher and more sacred authority, in the sublime opening of St. John's Gospel, and in St. Paul's speech to the Athenians.

I have said that the propriety of applying the words *verstand* and *vernunft* by Kant and Jacobi, the former to the lower, and the latter to the higher endowment of the human mind, and the words *understanding* and *reason* in a corresponding way, has been questioned. Such application, however, has probably become too established to be now set aside. We use *reason* indeed, when we are not dealing with its distinction from understanding in the wide range of meaning to which I have already

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referred ; but when we are engaged with the distinction, it would be troublesome and difficult to find other words to denote it than those now before us.

The words *rational* and *rationalism* plainly come from *ratio*, *reason*, but reason in the large sense as denoting the human mind in general. The title *rationalist* was at first given to a school in medicine, which insisted on grounds and principles instead of with the empiricists going by mere experience. See **Dogmatism**, **Empiricism**. In modern times it usually denotes one who excludes the *supernatural* from his belief.

Reminiscence, the art of calling to mind anything in the past instead of merely remembering it when presented with it anew. The word answers to the Greek ἀνάμνησις, as distinguished from μνήμη ; to the Latin *recordatio*, as distinguished from *memoria* ; to the French *réminiscence*, as distinguished from *souvenir* ; and perhaps to *memory*, as distinguished from *recollection* in ordinary English : “ Beasts and babies remember, that is, recognise : man alone recollects.”¹

Resentment. This word is now applied only to the feeling of anger awakened by real or imagined wrong. It formerly, however, bore a wider sense corresponding to its formation, and denoted the fit return of sentiment to any sort of treatment, good or evil, gratitude for good, anger for evil. Barrow continually speaks of the *resentment* due

¹ COLERIDGE, *Lit. Rem.* vol. i. p. 336.

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to God on our parts for His loving-kindness towards us.¹

Science. Formed from the participle present of the verb *scio*. This word would of itself denote simply *knowledge* of any kind and of anything. It has long, however, been used as the equivalent of the Greek *ἐπιστήμη*. That was distinguished alike from *δόξα*, *opinion*, and *εμπειρία*, *experience*, also from *τέχνη*, *art*. That there is a distinction between these things is vaguely felt, I suppose, by us all. Nobody would give the name of science to his acquaintance with his friend, or with a narrative, still less would he confer the title on the common arts of which everyone is to some extent a master. Yet though all feel the distinction to some extent, comparatively few, I suspect, will be found ready with a definition of science, or secure against misapplication of the word. The procurement of such a definition is the professed aim of Plato's *Theætetus*, but after putting several to the test, and showing the inadequacy of each, the dialogue ends without an answer to the inquiry. Aristotle defines science to be the knowledge of a thing by its necessary cause. This of course implies that it is knowledge by demonstration, and demonstration he calls the scientific syllogism. Bacon so far coincides that he pronounces the knowledge of things by their causes to be the aim and intention of science,

¹ *E.g.* “We should find delight in thankful *resentment* of all God’s benefits.”—Sermon on *Rejoice Evermore*.

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though he would not have laid the like stress with Aristotle on the abstract necessity of such causes, and therefore on the need of demonstration. It is plain, however, that in laying down the knowledge of a thing by its cause as the constituent of science, we have only stated the *unit* of that, and that a larger view must be gained before we learn what we ought to mean in dignifying a branch of knowledge with the title. Sir W. Hamilton supplies us with the following definition : "A science is a complement of cognitions having, in point of form, the character of logical perfection, in point of matter, the character of real truth." Mr. Chretien views each science truly such, as knowledge evolved from a fundamental idea.¹

All these views are true and harmonious. When they are fully entertained, they will lead to a rejection of the limited use of the words *science* and *scientific*, now so prevalent, which denotes by them only physical research, and it may be suspected often applies the title to branches of such research merely because of their matter, and without asking if they have attained the form and logical perfection without which they have not yet become science.

Still I have said that Plato's efforts, and Aristotle's definition, tend rather to presenting in the unit of science than with the ordered methodized group of cognitions which con-

¹ See too COLERIDGE on *Method*.

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stitutes in any subject-matter what we call *a* science. Hamilton's definition, and those we gain from Coleridge and Chretien, supply us with an adequate view of the latter. The Greek termination *λογία*, turned by us into *logy*, indicates that the matter denoted by the prefix to which it is subjoined claims when known to be a science.¹ This claim may be just, or it may be, to say the least, premature. Phrenology doubtless is not without its truths, but none but its devotees will admit its title to be ranked among the sciences. Theology seems a term which is utterly misapplied, if, according to the etymological analogy, we take it to mean a science of God. That knowledge of Him wherein "standeth our eternal life," can be no more science than is our acquaintance with an earthly relation or friend. And a science of Him in any full or complete sense must be

¹ Not necessarily, however, for *λογία* may mean nothing more than discourse on such and such a subject. Still I think it has in compound words with us the force assigned to it in the text. The tendency to name in this way every branch of human inquiry, no matter however subordinate to some other already well defined, is, I think, to be deprecated. Some of our German brethren carry it very far. The prevalent doctrines of an age respecting Redemption has been called among them the *Soteriology* of that age, the views held respecting the end of the world its *Eschatology*. To an English mind this seems more pedantic than useful, although many of us seem following the example.

With regard to the allusions in the text to Plato, it must be remembered that the negative conclusions of the *Theætetus* by no means measure his views of science. Elsewhere we have his positive standards, but the consideration of them is foreign to the purpose of the present article.

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impossible to mortals, impossible for ever, one must think, to creatures. Some great principles, no doubt, result in reflecting minds from knowledge of Him which take the scientific form, nor, so long as this holds only its proper place, is its importance to be denied, or its study neglected.

Sense, Common. The word *sense*, when not denoting a single sense in itself; but its result as disclosing something external, seems nearly synonymous with *perception*. By *common sense* the schoolmen meant the apperception produced by the combined action of different senses. Sight, hearing, and touch continually result in one impression of the object before us. This is the *common sense*.

In the philosophy of Reid and his followers *common sense* has a force different from this. Here it denotes the primary beliefs which are common to all men, and which, incapable of proof themselves, are the bases of all proof. This is by no means identical with the conversational use of the term, whereby it denotes the average judgment of men on ordinary matters, the want of which makes a man act weakly and absurdly. Strange to say, however, no less a philosopher than Sir James Mackintosh confounds the two, and blames Reid for adopting the term *common sense* as the base of his philosophy.

Species. Perhaps no word has had a more curious history, or run through a greater variety of meanings, than this. Derived from an old verb,

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specio, I behold, it meant in the first instance both actively *a beholding*, and passively *a thing beheld, a shape, aspect*. In connection with the latter it sometimes denoted *pomp* or *splendour*, sometimes *show, semblance, deception*. Keeping to the more general notion of *shape, aspect*, we see that it exactly corresponded to the Greek *εἶδος*, and are therefore prepared to find it passing through corresponding phases of meaning. Like that, it denotes in philosophy the universal, consisting of genus and differentia, the class within a class. We are all familiar with this now the commonest sense of the word *species*, a sense naturally flowing from its original meaning, for the *species* is the form or aspect under which we view the object before us, when we have a definite notion of it.

Species, however, has, or perhaps rather had, another sense in philosophy. It was used to denote the mental representation of an object which was supposed to intervene between the object itself and the mind's perception of it. Of course this meaning is identical with the primary one of species, i. e. *form, aspect, appearance*. I need not dwell on it further, for I suppose the doctrine which it expressed has altogether disappeared.

Species likewise meant in Roman law fruits of the earth, such as corn, wine, oil, and indeed provisions and commodities of nearly any sort. There are regulations for bringing on demand those various *species* instead of their equivalent in money; and hence, doubtless by association

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with the logical sense of the word, the phrase payment *in kind*. In later Greek, too, $\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\lambda\delta\eta$ mean *spices*, *costly wares*. Gold and silver also were included among species, and it is singular that modern usage has restricted the word in this sense to them (corrupting it into *specie*), whereas the old regulations enforced the bringing the articles needed, *the species*, instead of their price in money. Species in this sense by an easy transition has taken the shape of *spice*, which now denotes aromatic drugs. Spice was formerly used, however, in the logical sense of species.

“Absten you fro all yvil *spice*.”—1 Thess. v. 22.
Wiclis.

“The *spices* of penance ben three.”—Chaucer,
‘The Parson’s Tale.’

“Justice, although it be but one entire virtue, yet is described in two kinds of *spices*.”—Sir T. Elyot, ‘The Governor.’¹

It has been conjectured that the word *species* as applied to the bread and wine in the Eucharist was at first used in the sense now before us. Bread and wine were the offerings of fruit and produce of the earth which were presented by the faithful as materials for the holiest rite of their religion. This may have been the case, but it is plain that in subsequent controversy, when it was laid down that Christ was present under the *species* of bread and wine, species was used in its primitive sense of *shape*, *aspect*, or *appearance*.

¹ See TRENCH’S *Select Glossary*, in voce,

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Still, the same association with logical thought which we have observed in the phrase payment *in kind*, is found here, and the phrases *in one kind*, *in both kinds*, have perpetuated themselves in Eucharistic controversy. “Under the *forms of bread and wine*” may perhaps indicate the like association with philosophy awakened by the word species.

Spirit. This word, like its Greek correspondent *πνεῦμα*, is derived from the notion of breeze or breathing. It serves generally to denote immaterial substance, and a *spirit* means an unembodied or a disembodied being. In its highest application it denotes the Third Person of the blessed Trinity. When it refers to ourselves it may be thought merely synonymous with *soul* or *mind*, and so it often is. But there is a philosophy, and that a sacred one, which distinguishes between these. In the New Testament the human being is regarded as threefold, consisting of *body*, *soul*, and *spirit* (1 Thess. v. 23); and the distinction between the two latter of these, *soul* and *spirit*, is found in 1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 44, 45, and in Heb. iv. 12. This trichotomy pervades the philosophy of the time, and something equivalent to it must be acknowledged by any which takes a large view of human nature. The distinction between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, *soul* and *spirit*, in a great degree corresponds to that of the Greeks between *διάνοια* and *νοῦς*, that of the Latins between *anima* and *animus*, and in our later schools

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to that between understanding and reason, though in the New Testament it is connected with considerations beyond what would necessarily be brought out by these.

The adjective *ψυκικὸς*¹ is rendered in our version by *natural*—“the natural man” “a natural body”; in the Vulgate more felicitously by *animal*—“the animal man,” “an animal body.”² “This is exactly what Wiclif meant when he translated the ‘corpus animale’ which he found in his Vulgate, ‘a beastly body.’ The word (beastly) had then no ethical colouring.”³

The recognition of this distinction between *soul* and *spirit*, whatever terms for the two we may employ, is essential, as I have said, to any large or just survey of human nature. From its frequent occurrence in the New Testament, such recognition is of necessity to the right understanding of that, both as regards its view of our present condition, in such places as 1 Cor. ii. and many others, and of our prospects in the future in 1 Cor. xv. 44, 45. The spirit which is in us now, ennobling our being, and giving us rank higher than that of merely first among animals, must not be confounded with the illuminating and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit though it makes us susceptible of these. The spiritual body in which we are to be raised is

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 44, 45.

² In St. Jude it is translated *sensual*.

³ TRENCH, *Select Glossary*, p. 20.

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to differ from our present psychical one in this, that whereas the latter is animated by the lower faculty the *psyche* or soul and is the organ of that; the former is to be animated by the *πνεῦμα* or spirit, and to serve for the organ of that, a sublime expectation, the object of which we can only contemplate darkly and fitfully at present, and with mingled wonder and awe.

Spirits, Animal Spirits. When people speak of "high spirits," or "great animal spirits," the majority are probably quite unaware that they are borrowing terms from a once prevalent though now abandoned philosophy. So, however, it is. It was long believed that the nerves were hollow tubes, through which ran to and from the brain subtle fluids or vapours which were called *the animal spirits*. Nay, many, such as Bacon and others of his time, held that all matter enclosed such.¹ The prevalence of this doctrine in Bacon's speculations on natural history must be familiar to all who are acquainted with his *Sylva Sylvarum*; and in the *De Veterum Sapientia* he makes the hidden Proserpine symbolical of the occult spirit in things.

To return, however, to *animal spirits*. Des Cartes considered their operation the cause of all our movements, sensations, and perceptions. The theory I believe to be quite obsolete, resting on facts without evidence; nay, at variance with what we know of the nerves, and utterly failing

¹ Going much farther back, the well-known passage in the sixth *Aeneid* will occur to my readers.

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to explain the insoluble mystery of perception, and the acting of matter on mind. Its remains nevertheless are found in the phrases by which we habitually denote vivacity of temperament.

Subject, Subjective. The word *subject*, from the Latin *subjaceo*, is the exact translation of the Greek *ὑποκείμενον*, and denotes in logic the same thing, that in a proposition of which something else is predicated. It is obvious that there can be no predicate without a subject. I can affirm or deny nothing, except of something.

From subject comes the adjective *subjective*, which was employed from an early date by the Latin logicians, and gave rise, though apparently not till some time after, to its counterpart *objective*. I have already stated that these words, so much bandied about in the present day, have had their original and scholastic meaning quite transposed. With the schoolmen and such divines as Bishop Morton and Mede, in the seventeenth century, subjective meant of or belonging to the subject of a proposition, objective that which is presented to the mind and thought upon. Hence that is subjective which exists in anything outside the mind, objective when thought upon by the mind; and hence an *objective* presence in the Eucharist was conceded in the controversy with Rome, a *subjective* presence denied, which is exactly the reverse use of the words as now employed in the same controversy.

The later philosophies of Germany, however, viewing the individual mind as the only subject,

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have naturally used the word *subjective* for what has its seat there, and *objective* for that which is presented to it, or conceived to be so, from without, and by *subjective* and *objective* people nowadays respectively mean inward and mental, or external and perceived.¹

Whichever meanings we prefer, it will be well, I think, to confine our use of these words to philosophical reasoning. In such they are convenient, if not indispensable. When we are discoursing on subjects and objects as such, we may well avail ourselves of the paronyms subjective and objective. But outside the schools they are unnecessary, and to my mind ugly, words; and as used at present serve no purpose that could not just as well be achieved by *mental* and *external*.

Subsistence, Substance. The former of these words is derived from the verb *subsisto*, which among its shades of meaning signifies *to remain*. A thing *subsistens per se* is therefore something which has endurance in itself. Substance is derived by St. Augustine from the same verb; but by the majority from *substo*, *to stand under*. A thing *substans* therefore is that which is *standing under* attributes or accidents, that of which they are the attributes or accidents.

“Aucun homme jouissant de son bon sens ne

¹ Neither Sir W. Hamilton nor his editor Dean Mansel seem to have observed this. The former speaks of the use of subject for the subject of a proposition, an ὑπόκειμενον in external things, as a departure from scholastic usage (*Metaph.* vol. i. p. 162). Nor did either Trendelenburg or Prantl, though known to him, lead his editor to notice the error.

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contestera cette règle de grammaire: Tout adjetif se rapporte à un substantif; ou cet axiome de logique: Tout attribut suppose un sujet. Mais ces deux propositions ne sont, l'une dans la langage l'autre dans la forme générale de nos jugements, que l'expression d'un principe métaphysique: toute phénomène, toute qualité, toute manière d'être se rapporte à une substance.”¹

“The word *substance* (*substantia*) may be employed in two, but in two kindred, meanings. It may be used either to denote that which exists absolutely and of itself; in this sense it may be viewed-as derived from *subsistendo*, and as meaning *ens per se subsistens*; or it may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which sense it may be regarded as derived from *substando*, and as meaning *id quod substet accidentibus*, like the Greek ὑποστασις, ὑποκείμενον. In either case it will, however, signify the same thing, viewed in a different aspect. In the former meaning, it is considered in contrast to, and independent of, its attributes; in the latter as conjoined with them, and as affording them the condition of existence.”²

There would seem, therefore, to be no great difference between the meanings of the words *subsistence* and *substance*. A difference in their use, however, there is. *Substance* is, and from the first was, the Latin term for the Greek οὐσία.

¹ FRANCK, *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*, vol. vi. p. 796, ed. 1852.

² Sir W. HAMILTON, *Metaphysics*, vol. i. p. 149.

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Consequently the far-famed Homoousion of Nice was expressed in the West by *consubstantial*, “of one substance with.” Now the Greeks were wont, not uniformly indeed at first, but universally at last, to speak of the Persons of the Trinity as three *Hypostases*, of which, in point of etymological force, three *Substances* would have been the exact rendering. From this, however, the Latin was debarred by his appropriation of *substance* to the expression of ὁντία. There did not, however, seem to be the same objection to speaking of three *subsistences* in the Godhead, the word *subsistence* answering to ὑπόστασις as well as to ὑποκείμενον, and applying to the Persons of the Trinity, if we are to mean anything by ascribing to them abiding personality. But three *substances* in the Latin sense of the word would have been language altogether inadmissible. While the Greeks and Latins were thus thrown on different and almost contradictory terms to denote this sacred mystery, the great luminaries of East and West saw and announced that the same truth was intended by both.

Leaving divinity, and returning to the first category, that of ὁντία or *substance*, we find derived from the latter term the grammatical titles *noun substantive* and *verb substantive*, the connection of both with the expression of that category being abundantly obvious. Similarly too we have the phrases *the substance of the case*, and *substantially the same*.

Technical. Of or belonging to a τέχνη or art. Technical words and technical phrases, therefore, are such as are employed in any art by those who pursue it. Such are therefore called *terms of art*. But as the language of the schools has given the title of *arts* to the studies which form the basis of a liberal education (hence the degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts), and as the distinction between science and art is not uniformly observed, a particular science very generally having an art for its handmaid, nay, the science and the art being often the same thing viewed in different relations, the epithet *technical* has come to characterize the especial words and phrases which are used by the votaries of any particular pursuit.

To use technical language in ordinary discourse, and when there is no occasion for it, is justly stigmatized as pedantry. But in following the pursuits to which they belong, terms of art furnish two benefits which amply justify their adoption: they are aids to memory, and they are preservatives from ambiguity.

Theory. θεωρία. *A beholding*, from θεωρέω, *to look at, to behold*. Hence *theory* comes to mean *mental contemplation* as distinguished from practice, and knowledge is divided into *theoretical* and *practical*, according as its end is merely speculative or to be carried out in action. These, however, cannot always or generally be kept separate. Mere theoretic knowledge, knowledge that furnishes no guide to any sort of action, is a rarer possession than might at first sight be imagined, if indeed

THEORY.

such a possession exists, while no practical art can be exercised without some knowledge of means and of ends, of causes and effects, which will come under the head of theory.

The theoretical and the practical life are, the one that of the contemplative student, the other that of the man of business, of politics, and of affairs.

These are the true meanings of the words *theory* and *theoretic*. The making the former a synonym of *conjecture* is an abusive application of it, though it is one largely made. Even so distinguished a man as Reid is guilty of it.¹

Topic. This word as frequently used, nowadays, denotes the whole subject of discourse, a meaning flowing out of, but not altogether identical with, its proper sense. With Aristotle, in the eight books of *Topics*, and in the treatise on Rhetoric, the term *τόπος* means a *locus communis*, a *commonplace*, and is the original of these titles. A *topic* is thus identical with a *maxim*, although some of the schoolmen drew a distinction between the two, denoting by the *topic* or *commonplace* the head of thought to which the maxim belongs. For example, *testimonium* is the *locus* to which the dictum *semper cuilibet in arte suu credendum est* is to be referred, and the Port Royalists and Dr. Watts adhere to this distinction. It is not, however, Aristotelian. The titles *τόπος* and *locus* indicate,

¹ See REID's *Works*, p. 97 and p. 235, Hamilton's ed.; and HAMILTON's *Metaphysics*, pp. 172, 174.

TOPIC.]

as Cicero observes, that a general or received maxim is a *seat* of argument in which the disputant may find the weapon which he wants.

As arguments from places must scarcely ever be more than probable, inasmuch as the place itself is but a received dictum,¹ the adjective *topical* has been used by some writers as almost synonymous with probable. "That," such will be found saying, "is no more than a *topical* argument."

The uselessness of studying topics has been enlarged on by the Port Royal logicians and by Dr. Watts, and if our aim be scientific inquiry, or accurate and truthful reasoning, useless enough it must assuredly be. The lawyer, however, would hardly be persuaded to neglect the maxims of his profession; and though formal disputation outside the bar or the senate, and formal disputation was that which Aristotle had in view, has fallen into disuse, yet it is worth remarking how large a share in the common disputation which springs up in conversation is occupied by commonplaces. "Show me your company, and I will tell you what you are," and the like, are phrases which continually occur in ordinary discussion; and the thoughtful man will do well to suspect the arguments of which they form a feature.

The word *commonplace* is familiar to us in modern language, and is used as an adjective, meaning *ordinary, trite, insignificant*. This, I sus-

¹ Unless it be an axiom, and axioms have been ranked by some among places.

TOPIC.]

pect, is very modern : I doubt whether it is older than the age of Queen Anne, and whether it had much ascendancy till times nearer our own. Johnson in his *Dictionary* gives it neither as substantive nor adjective, but uses it himself as Todd notices in his criticism on Gray : "The ensuing stanza, exhibiting Mar's car and Jove's eagle, is unworthy of notice. Criticism despairs chasing the schoolboy to his *commonplaces*." It is beside my purpose to comment on the flagrant injustice of this as applied to a truly splendid imitation of one of the most magnificent passages in Pindar. What I have to remark is that the word before us is still used as a substantive, though it has broken loose from its technical and scholastic meaning. Todd himself takes no notice of the adjective.

Transcendent, Transcendental. These words, quite different in meaning with Kant, differed as used by the schoolmen no otherwise than as substantive and adjective, *transcendental* meaning of or belonging to a *transcendent*. The six transcendentals were realities above, *transcending* the predicaments. They were denoted by the letters R E U B A V—*res, ens, unum, bonum, aliquid, verum*.

In the Kantian philosophy *transcendent* means what is beyond the bounds of human cognition and thought ; *transcendentals* are therefore set aside by him as unattainable. *Transcendental* is his title for those forms of thought which are not

TRANSCENDENT.]

given by experience, but necessary to that, and to all mental operation upon that.

Universal. In the technical language of philosophy, a *general notion*, that of a class whether genus or species is called an *universal*. Since the *Isagoge* of Porphyry universals have generally been ranged under the five heads of genus, differentia, species, property, and accident, called in the title of his book the five $\phi\omega\nu\alpha\iota$, but in subsequent times more usually the five predicables. Aristotle, treating of the same subject, recognises only four. The question whether genus and species have independent reality is declined by Porphyry, but became the great philosophical controversy of the Middle Ages, that, under various subordinate aspects, of nominalism and realism.

Virtual. Till a comparatively recent time, *virtual* was synonymous with *potential*, and meant therefore what does not as yet actually exist. Now it for the most part means what does actually but not apparently exist. He is the *virtual* ruler who does actually control the body to which he belongs, though he has not the title or insignia of such. How this curious change of meaning arose it may be difficult to say. Johnson gives only the modern meaning of the word, and fails to observe that his quotations use it in the earlier.

Will. This word, both as substantive and verb, is used in a wide range of senses, partly from the want of a sufficient variety of names in our language for things essentially different, such as

WILL.]

wish, purpose, choice, self-determination, and partly from those who employ it having different theories of these. This is not the place to discuss those theories. I will content myself with pointing out that will as a substantive and as denoting a faculty of man, has constantly been taken in the sense of self-determination, and uniformly so by Kant and Coleridge. It is that in virtue of which each man is a cause of his own moral condition, that without which there would be no moral condition, and actions would be neither good nor bad. It is in virtue of will that we are spirits, and as such above nature, and without the chain of cause and effect, in which nature consists. It need not therefore perplex us that will should transcend the sphere of conception, and be incapable of definition. In these respects it but ranks with all that is highest, deepest, and ultimate, without and within us. It is therefore eminently a mystery, but a mystery which we cannot set aside without rebellion against the evidence of consciousness.

The sense of will, though thus residing in consciousness, is one which has grown, and become more a matter of thought to us than it was to the ancient world. No doubt the Christian faith is the main cause of this. Aristotle investigates the *voluntary* in the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but stops at *προάιρεσις, arbitrium*. S. Maximus,¹ following and transcribing him, is obliged

¹ L. Maximus ad Marin.

WILL.]

to go farther ; for in contemplating the mystery of our Lord's double nature, he is forced to say that it involved not only two *θέλημάτα*, but that in the same person there may be more than one *προάψεσις*, and therefore he proceeds to *ἔξουσία* and the *γνωμικὸν θέλημά*. We may well believe that the contemplation of this awful subject, rendered necessary by the controversies of the time, enlarged the view and strengthened the consciousness of will in man, as indeed the appeal of the Gospel to the inmost spirit would at any rate have done.

Worse Relation. In logic the degrees of relation between one term and another are called worse in proportion as they recede from that of pure identity or co-inclusion. Thus, "all men" and "mortal" stand to each other in a worse relation than "all men" and "all rational upon earth"; or "some men" and "wise" in a relation still worse than the foregoing; and when we come to exclusion or negation, we come to the worst relation of all.

This gradation gives rise to Sir W. Hamilton's canon for figured syllogisms. "What worse relation of subject to predicate subsists between either of two terms, and a common third term, with which one at least is positively related; that relation subsists between the two terms themselves."

This whole subject belongs so exclusively to formal logic, and "worse relation" to its techni-

WORSE RELATION.]

calities as to be out of place in the present work, but I am led to introduce it here in order to correct an error into which I fell in my *Outline of Logic*. I there, under some obfuscation of memory, represented Sir W. Hamilton as denying that the negative is a worse relation than the positive.¹ He does no such thing, and a moment's thought will show that, had he done so, he would have rendered his canon inapplicable to a large class of syllogisms.

¹ *Outline of Logic*, 2nd ed. p. 99.

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